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A RE-EVALUATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGEt
(Part I)tt
JAMES

A.

GARDNERtt-

S.. this problem of holding a just balance between the claims
of the State and the rights of the individual ....
For my part,
I think that it is far more than a question of treating X or Y
fairly in the individual cases: I think that unless we can find
a general solution to this problem we shall fail to preserve
an essential part of the pattern of our own democracy.*

I
INTRODUCTION

POUND HAS spoken of the sterility of the eighteen century
D EAN
natural law in the hands of the American judges in the nineteenth century.' The reason for this was that the rational underpinning
was not a good foundation - it was much too absolute, too much was
t This paper was originally written in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Laws in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University, J. S. D.
Program, 1957-58. It has since been revised.
tf Part II will appear in Volume VIII, Number 4.

ttt LL.B., Harvard, 1948; LL.M., Columbia, 1958; member of the Bar of

California and the Bar of Illinois; Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of
Law, 1956-57; Harlan F. Stone Fellow, Columbia University Law School, 1957-58;
now of the Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C.
This paper was written prior to the author's employment by the Department of
the Treasury. Nothing contained herein necessarily represents the views of the
Treasury Department.
* Kilmuir, The State, the Citizen and the Law, 73 L.Q. Rgv. 172 (1957).
1. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARv. L.
Rnv.591, 611 (1910).
The writer will state at the outset that he has drawn on the writings of Roscoe
Pound as background material throughout this paper. He believes it is necessary to
have some frame of reference, whether it be business, economics, philosophy,
history, or other thought modes, and his is to an undefined extent sociological juris-
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expected of it.' Likewise the lawyer in the nineteenth century perceived
of an idealized version of the common law as the true law or natural
law, and this tendency is present in the twentieth century, even to the
extent of perceiving the true law to be an idealized version of the
law as it existed in the nineteenth century, a much simpler period
in the history of our society.' This tendency is due in part to the
natural lag which must inevitably exist between society in transition
and the law which develops afterwards.4 Yet it is also due in part to
man's yearning for the simple life and in this country the tendency
to idealize the law of the rural nineteenth century scene and to pretend
prudence. By this the writer means a way of looking at or thinking about law,
having in mind the understanding of the role of law in society and the application of
the social sciences to the study of law in action and the rendering of law more
effective as an instrument of social control for the ends which law is designed to
accomplish in the civilization of the time and place. Moreover, the subject of
privilege, being in the realm of value judgments, lends itself easily to analysis from
this viewpoint and particularly with reference to the balancing of interests.
The writer's reading indicates that other background materials are available
which would lend authority to the same frame of reference, but the careful and
extensive writings of Dean Pound are more familiar to the writer and are therefore more readily accessible for easy reference and citation. The writer does not
subscribe to sociological idealism wholeheartedly, however. In fact, he believes that
he is a legal realist as to what courts and people do in fact. Yet, he does have

ideals, and he belieyes with Dean Pound that the judicial search for law is to be

governed, as in the past, by the ideals of the end of law and the legal order. "Such
ideals must be our main reliance today and tomorrow." Pound, The Theory of
Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. Rev. 940 (1923). How does this fit in with realism?
To quote and paraphrase the great idealistic philosopher Albert Schweitzer, "[M]y
knowledge is pessimistic [realistic], but my willing and hoping are optimistic
[idealistic]." OuT oP My LIVE AND THOUGHT, 240 (1933, Campion tr.; postscript
by Skillings, 1952). The writer also believes firmly in judicial empiricism, reason
tested by experience, with perhaps a dash of intuition. It is against the background of this philosophy that this paper has been developed.
The writer would like to add a quotation from Professor John M. Maguire,
which he will endeavor to hold up as a model: "This paper purposely avoids
chockingly profuse documentation, that bane of much contemporary legal writing
in the United States. Setting out the thesis that we do not now have the
answers, it is meant to be provocative instead of definitive. Provocation works
better when short and sharp." Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer's Tax Practice,
13 TAx L. Rgv. 27 n. 1 (1957). Moreover, this position is more necessary here in
the area of case law by virtue of the fact that most decisions are a mere mechanical application of precedent with little well considered judicial reasoning about
the underlying policies involved. Finally, in the citation of authority, secondary
sources only will be indicated generally for well settled propositions, except where
the writer has something more to say on the point. These authorities, particularly
the treatises of Wigmore and McCormick, contain a wealth of case material, and
no purpose would be served in its regurgitation when the work has already been
done and done so well. Furthermore, this practice is necessary to save time and
space and to devote these precious items to the service of concentration on the
topics which research and evaluation have indicated to be primary items for consideration in connection with the writer's central theme.
2. See POUND, LAW AND MORALS 87 et passim (2d ed. 1926). The word
"absolute" is used herein in the sense of eternal, immutable, and inherent in the
nature of things (sometimes, as inflexible, unyielding).
3. See Pound, Natural Natural Law and Positive Natural Law, 68 L. Q. REv.
330 (1952); POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 118-19 (1942).

4. See Holmes, Law and the Court, in

COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS

290, 294-95

(1920), for a colorful description of this lag and why it must ever be present.
But quaere: Is this necessarily true in periods of sharp mutation from the past,
for example, the eighteenth century? Today?
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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that it continues to exist and predominate in twentieth century urban
America.5 This mode of thinking has had a strong affect on the
development not only of our constitutional law but of all phases of
the substantive law and procedure as well.
The nineteenth century saw great reforms in the law, and legal
procedures were somewhat simplified. The first steps were taken
in overcoming technical adversary theories of litigation and in making
the courts more of a forum for the ascertaining of the true facts in
cases presented for decision, thereby enabling the triers of fact to
render more accurate verdicts. Between 1854 and 1883, in England,
legislation was enacted prescribing a simple procedure for the discovery in advance of trial of all relevant facts known to a party
about the opponent's case.' This was immediately successful, since
the right of a party to discovery of all the facts within the opponent's
knowledge was already a well established right in equity. There was
no opposition on the part of the English bar, and the procedures
were worked out so as to make the ascertaining of this evidence,
through written interrogatories, a standard part of the pretrial procedures. Here, the English bar drew the line, however, and discovery procedures have not been substantially changed since that period.
The development was somewhat different in the United States.
Here, law and equity were already merged in a number of states,
and equitable discovery was thus available at law in such states.
Moreover, the discovery procedures were being extended piecemeal in
all of the American jurisdictions. The result is to be found in the
various types of discovery statutes Which were enacted in the several
states and which continued to exist without substantial change down
to the time of the "open" discovery movement in the second and
third quarters of the present century. The successful application of
these statutes, however, was impeded by the tendency of the bench
5. For good general illustrations, see Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALZ L. J.
454 passim, esp. at 481-82 (1909).
6. The English Judicature Act of 1873 (36 & 37 VicT. c. 66) provided for
the final merger of law and equity and for a single form of procedure. The Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854 (17 & 18 Vicr. c. 125) had conferred discovery
powers on the common law courts. Procedural improvements affecting discovery
came as late as 1883. See Millar, Mechanism of Fact Discovery: A Study in
Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 ILL. L. Rxv. 261, 424 at 442-46 (1937), for a good
summary of the later English developments.
These procedures had long been available by bill in equity, but the procedures
were cumbersome and in effect required a special auxiliary suit. The simplified
procedures adopted for extension of equitable discovery as it then existed to actions
at law will be referred to hereafter as "liberal" discovery, as contradistinguished from
"open" discovery, by which we mean the opportunity to ascertain through the
judicial process in the same action and in advance of trial knowledge of all facts
relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit from all available sources, unless
such facts are privileged from discovery by virtue of some countervailing policy of
the law.
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
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and bar to maintain the technical interpretations formerly practiced
in equity and to refuse to disclose such evidence freely and fairly.
The attitude of the legal community was one of opposition to the
disclosure of one's case in advance of trial, and this attitude was
strongly felt in the restrictive interpretation of discovery statutes and
in the relegation practically to oblivion of the fundamental equitable
principle referred to above. The objective sought by counsel was
the dramatic pageantry of the climatic movement of surprise (and

victory) in open court. The result was that the contentious attitude
of counsel, together with the technicalities of the rulings, the lack of
adequate sanctions for enforcement, and the preoccupation of both
courts and lawyers with other aspects of the litigation process prevented the practice of directing written interrogatories to the opponent (and the development of this technique)

from gaining the

success which it had achieved in England, where special commissioners
were appointed to handle the pretrial aspects of the case and, this
method of discovery became standard procedure in all important
litigation.
The oral deposition however was more popular in America,
though its most effective use was hindered by the expense, the consumption of time, and the lack of trained reporters of testimony.
Also, the interpretation of the term "relevance" in the more narrow
sense, as that which has probative value on the actual issues framed
by the pleadings, resulted in the courts' applying the same technical
rules of evidence in pretrial deposition hearings as were applicable
in trials in open court. These factors caused liberal discovery to be
only partially successful in America, in that it never enabled a party
to achieve the same understanding of the opponent's actual knowledge
of the case as in England. For such understanding, the lawyers
and their clients relied upon their own extra-judicial resources,
which however became more and more limited with the transition
from a rural to an urban society.
The times were not yet ripe for the advent of a streamlined system
of open discovery, but the continuing failure of the legal system to meet
the requirements of society was becoming increasingly apparent. Yet,
open discovery would come only with the passing of the courtroom
scene as the dramatic center of the community life, the growth of a new
generation of lawyers, the congestion of court calendars, and the
new complexities of life, together with the concomitant difficulties
of ascertainment of the facts in twentieth century urban America. Important also was a change in attitude of the public and the bar as to what
constitutes justice. The idea that the party with the rightful claim to a
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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decision in his favor should be deprived of that decision because of
a surprise turn in the trial which diligent counsel failed to meet and
for which he could not reasonably be blamed came to be looked upon
as a just basis for criticism of the system itself. These factors,
coupled with diversion of the business traditionally handled by
lawyers to other professional groups and the transfer of large areas
of legal matters from the courts to administrative agencies, made
it apparent to the farsighted that the judicial system itself, far from
having attained the degree of perfection formerly proclaimed by
many leaders of the profession, would require substantial reform in all
aspects of its procedures. This would include the drastic revision of
the discovery procedures no less than other parts of the judicial
machinery. Yet, this revision took place only piecemeal, and discovery procedures offered more than ordinary resistence to reform first in legislative enactment and later in the resistence of the bar to
interpretation in accordance with the spirit of the measures, and
also in judicial reluctance to change. More than two generations of
reform agitation followed the English reforms and the reform of
pleadings procedures in America before the first great stride was
made in this direction through the adoption of a system of open
discovery. It came first in the federal jurisdiction, where the discovery procedures had remained the most undeveloped, in the form
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938.' This
initial victory, however, placed the federal system far in advance of
the English practice. Since the adoption of the federal rules, state
court jurisdictions have been gradually adopting similar open discovery procedures. Today, the bar in general is conscious of the
advantages of full disclosure in the interest of accuracy in factfinding, which in turn tends to support the ends of justice. 8 This
7. The FEDtRAL RuLrs Ol CIVIL PROCDURE were adopted in 1938. Rule 26 (b)
provides for liberal discovery of "any matter not privileged, which is. relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action .... It is not ground for objection
that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." The last
sentence was added by amendment in 1946. Rules 26-36 contain the five principal
methods of discovery. See also 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC'TrIM
26.23 [3, 7, 8]
(2d ed. 1950) (hereinafter cited as MOORE).
This last point was settled in England at least as early as 1875. See Blackburn,
J., in Hutchinson v. Glover [1875] L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 138 (C.A.). In answer to an
objection that it was not clearly shown that the document in question would be
evidence for the party claiming inspection, he said: "Whether a document would
be evidence or not for the party claiming inspection is not a test of the right to it.
Everything which will throw light on the case is prima facie subject to inspection."
For post-Revolutionary development of fact discovery in America, see Millar,
op. cit. note 6 at 446-452.
8. "The starting point in the consideration of any privilege is the realization
that its universal and immediate effect upon the search for truth is to close off one
avenue of information about the facts. The policy issue, then, is whether the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
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of course is a full swing of the pendulum from the attitude which held
out for the sporting theory of justice, broad rules of privilege, and
the technical rules of exclusion existing at the classical common law.
By the beginning of the present century, efforts were being made to
reform the law of evidence so as to make it a simple, easily applied
set of rules designed for ascertaining the truth, justifiable by reason of public policy, and workable in practice. Much of this goal
has been accomplished; but, much remains to be done and progress
therefore continues.
In one area of the law of evidence, namely, the area of the
personal privileges, much criticism has been made of the rules as
being conducive to injustice by reason of their prevention of full
disclosure of all relevant facts, thereby tending to cause inaccuracies
in the trial of lawsuits. In general, the rules of law in this area
were well worked out by the beginning of the present century.
This, however, was not the case as to all aspects of the law of personal
privilege. New developments in the area of adjective law have taken
place in the context of the emergence of a new and different kind
of society from that which existed in the nineteenth century. Among
the factors which have affected recent developments in procedure
have been the following: new emphasis upon and an enlarged conception of the nature and scope of human rights; new complexities
in the detection of criminal activities and in the prosecution of persons
charged with crime; the rise of the modern business corporation and
complex business methods and activities. These developments have
made it necessary to apply rules and principles of law formulated
for use in our earlier society to the situations arising in our presentday world. This in turn has made it necessary to revise the old
rules to meet the needs of the new age and to create new rules
when the old ones could not be adapted to the changed conditions.
The result has been a somewhat ad hoc extension of the rules of
privilege, often without adequate attention to and understanding
of the philosophy of privilege. Furthermore, until recently, the
tendency has been to extend the attorney-client privilege far beyond
what strict adherence to policy (and precedent) might reasonably be
said to require.
In our adversary system of administering justice, the lawyer
occupies a central position as investigator, adviser, manager, and
repository of facts and law. This makes the attorney-client privilege
the most important of the personal privileges, especially from the
resulting benefits
EVIDtNCz

justify this

288 (1954)

sacrifice of

(hereinafter cited as

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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standpoint of its involvement, actual or potential, in every lawsuit.
Moreover, it is the privilege in which lawyers as a class are most
directly interested and over which they have the greatest degree
of control. It is the privilege which is most directly a part of the
litigation process in every instance. Therefore, in any case for the
examination of the place of the privileges in the law of today, this
privilege would have the claim to be first evaluated.
Much has been written on the attorney-client privilege, but only
Professor Wigmore's monumental treatise has attempted in recent
years to examine the underlying policy of the privilege as well as to
state the rules of evidence which are necessary to support that policy.
However, Wigmore's treatment of the matter, based largely on history and analysis, was the product of institutions and modes of
thought of the nineteenth century, stemming mostly from, and in
answer to, the rationalist analysis of Jeremy Bentham.' New developments, derived from new modes of thought, based upon new
experiences in a vastly different society and tempered by considerations derived from experiences with the methods of modern science,
totalitarian governments and ideologies, and a quickened interest in
humanitarian principles and human rights,'" should now be taken
into account in any evaluation of the rules of law, procedural as well
as substantive. Therefore, the writer believes that further consideration of the privileges in relation to their proper place in a
rational scheme of evidence is in order. Rules of procedure can only be
justified when based upon sound policy, and such policy must give
effect to some intrinsic value which the law endeavors to support. As
Dean Pound would put it, we must weigh our procedures with
reference to the substantive rights which we are endeavoring to
secure." The writer will examine the attorney-client privilege against
9. Wigmore was born in 1863 and received his law degree in 1887. Wigmore's
edition of GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE appeared in 1899, and the first edition of Wigmore's
own treatise on evidence appeared in 1906. The ideological nineteenth century
did not end until 1914, however.
10. The following writings are among the best examples which the writer has
found to give a proper frame of reference: D'ENTREVES, THE NATURAL LAW
(1951);

(1949);
(1951);

(1951);
(1955) ;
Lasswell, The Threat to Privacy, in

MARTAIN, MAN AND THE' STATE
DENNING, THE ROAD TO JUsTICE

DENNING, FREEDOM UNDER LAW
POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY
CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES 121-40

(Maclver editor 1952) ; Donnelly, The Law of Evidence: Privacy and Disclosure,
14 LA. L. Rv. 361 (1954); Connery, The Right to Silence, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 180
(1955) ; Kilmuir, The State, the Citizen and the Law, 73 L. Q. REv. 172 (1957);
Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REv. 683
(1956) ; Kaganiec, Lie Detector Tests and 'Freedom of the Will' in Germany, 51
Nw. U. L. REv. 446 (1956).
11. Dean Pound to the writer in a personal conference, Harvard Law School,
February 25, 1958. Mr. Sutherland has put it thus: "Legislation designating the
method of enforcing and establishing substantive rights, as a general rule, is
enacted not for an end in itself, but to provide a better way of accomplishing an
end." III SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6802 at 321 (3rd ed. 1943).
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this background (and will consider the other personal privileges
incidentally, where appropriate to illustrate the thesis which he has
formulated).
The writer believes that the attorney-client privilege should
be preserved but that it should again be restricted in scope to the
narrow area of the personal relationship of the client to his attorney
in their face-to-face dealings.12 When thus limited,'" it will not substantially affect the processes of accurate fact-finding and yet will
preserve the most essential values which should be recognized as the
basis for the justification of the continued existence of the privilege in
the twentieth century. An evaluation of this proposition will be the
subject of this paper.
II
HISTORY AND POLICY OF THE PRIVILEGES

A. History:
At the early common law, testimony of witnesses was the exception rather than the rule, and there was no such thing as compulsory
testimony.' 4 The modes of trial were formal and certainly unscientific
in the sense that they were not based on the ascertainment of the
facts and the application of the law to such facts, as is true today."
In fact, it was not until the latter part of the seventeenth century
that the modern modes of trial in open court by impartial jurors
without previous knowledge of the evidence came into existence,16
and the conception of the rule of law was likewise slow in developing. 7
12. By "face-to-face" dealings, we mean what the client seeking legal advice
says directly to the attorney in a personal conference and in strict confidence. To
give adequate protection to such' communications, what the attorney says to the
client in reply must generally be covered also. For reasons of necessity and
convenience, communications transmitted by messengers should likewise be covered.
An interpreter or a translator; would fall in the same category as a messenger.
These kinds of situations will be referred to hereafter when used in connection
with the attorney-client communications as "the face-to-face situation," and. the
relationship of the client and his lawyer encompassed thereby will be referred to
as "the face-to-face relationship."
13. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947), is a recent leading case
that by specific language and broader implication tended to recognize the proper
scope of the privilege. The implications of this case will be discussed briefly in
Section Five, Subsection E post and will be dealt with more fully in a forthcoming
paper.
14. IX HOLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY ov ENGLISH LAW 177 et seq. (3d ed. 1944)
(hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH). See also VIII WIGmoRs, EVIDENCE § 2290
(3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as Wigmore), for a good short history of testimonial compulsion.
15. IX HOLDSWORTH 177 et seq.
16. Id. 130-31, 178, 181; and I HOLDSWORTH 312-21, esp. at 319 (7th ed. 1956),
on the origin and development of the jury system.
17. See Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American Law, 42 HARV. L.
Rzv. 149, 171-72 (1928-29); revised and published in book form under the title of

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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As a result of this slow evolution of the mode of trial to the present
day system, the right to insist upon the production of evidence for
purposes of proof did not come into being all at one time but rather
developed piecemeal, with numerous exceptions to the rules for the
compulsory production of testimony.18 These exceptions are only
gradually being eliminated, and remnants thereof remain in the system of evidence to the present time.
Moreover, it was not until the sixteenth century that the practice of relying on the sworn testimony of witnesses became general.
One reason for this was that such evidence was usually most untrustworthy. Since suits frequently originated in deliberate perjury,
the courts took a strict attitude toward witnesses who might voluntarily come forward and testify, by enlarging the offenses of maintenance and conspiracy. But if a witness gave his testimony at the
request of the court, it was a defense to the charge of maintenance.
Nevertheless, the practice of the use of testimony of witnesses, once
begun, was continued with increasing frequency until it became the
predominant mode of proof. By the time of the Tudors the tide had
turned in favor of the production of evidence chiefly through witnesses, at least for the purpose of making out the case for the
Crown. By the statute of 1562-1563,19 it was provided that witnesses
could be compelled to attend court and testify; and by the middle
of the seventeenth century, the functions of the witnesses and the
jury were entirely distinct.2" The basic evolution of the system to
one of trial in open court was now complete.
Furthermore, the only mode of taking testimony at common law
was in open court. The bill of discovery and the bill to perpetuate
testimony were equitable in nature and, as has been pointed out previously, did not become a part of the regular modes of pretrial
procedures until relatively modern times.2 ' In chancery, discovery
was limited to the opposing party's testimony, and even this could be
elicited only as to such material facts, including documents, as related to the proponent's case. One could not discover the case of the
opponent. Also, the bill of discovery never extended to third parties or their documents. In theory, the party was merely inspecting
that which was his own. For example, a plaintiff in bringing an
action on a contract might inspect the contract in the defendant's
Cf. VANDERBILT,
GOVERNMENT (1948).
(on rule of law).
18. See IX HOLDSWORTH 185 et seq.
19. 5 ELIZ. c. 9, Sec. 12.
20. I HOLDSWORTH 334-36; IX HOLDSWORTH 182-83.

LIBERTY AGAINST

JUDGES

AND JURORS

3-18

(1956)

seq. of Law Digital Repository, 1963
at 437 etSchool
note 6 Widger
op. cit.Charles
See Millar,
Published21.
by Villanova
University
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possession but not the release. Statutes later extended this right of
discovery to cases at law. Except where based on the equity practice,
such statutes were broader than in equity; for example, a particular
statute might extend to all witnesses in civil cases. 22 Criminal discovery got off to a late start and has developed more slowly. It is
only now coming to receive substantial attention by the courts,
2
legislatures, and jurists. 3
Until recently, it remained the rule in this country that a party
did not have to give testimony or submit to examination except upon
deposition pursuant to subpoena or in open court. 24 This still remains true in the case of third parties; notice, however, has been
made sufficient to require litigants themselves to testify in civil
cases.25 In criminal cases, persons charged with crime are not required
to speak, not even when under arrest and in the custody of the
sheriff. Thus, it is readily apparent that the notion that one is not
under any legal duty to disclose matters of personal knowledge (except where specifically required to do so by legislative enactment) has
had a long past in our history and still retains substantial vitality,
even in the face of modern attitudes of liberality toward discovery
and fact-finding. This has resulted in a way of thinking on the part
of the bar which presumed the privilege of freedom from giving
information to the fact-gatherers. Any infringement on this presumption
of freedom from compulsory disclosure had to be justified and would
be vigorously opposed. The converse position might have been
logically and reasonably accepted and any claim of privilege required
to be justified, but in actuality this attitude continued to exist and
to control legal thinking until well into the second quarter of the
twentieth century. Its effects are to be seen in the juristic decisions
pertaining to pretrial discovery and testimonial immunity at the
present time.
With this general background in mind, it is easy to understand
how the attorney-client privilege originated in our law. It was recognized in the reign of Elizabeth I, almost contemporaneously with
22. See discussion of depositions and discovery in VI

WIGMORE

§ 1845 et seq.,

esp. §§ 1850, 1856, 1856a, 1856c, 1856d, and 1857.
23. For a good recent discussion, see McCORMIcK 210; see also VI WIGMORt
§ 1850. And see Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparentf 49
CALIF. L. Rtv. 56 (1961), esp.. the authorities cited at 57 note 2 and 59 note 9.
For a brief description of modern English criminal discovery, which is more advanced than criminal discovery in the United States, see id. 64-67.
24. California joined those states adopting liberal discovery as recently as
January 1, 1958. See CODE oF Civ. PROC. § 2016 et seq. For comparison of the
former practice in California with the federal practice, see CoDE op CIV. PROC.
§ 1000 (1949 ed.) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 26-36. And see Louisell, Discovery Today,
45 CAI. L. Rtv. 486 (1957).
25. E.g.: FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a) ; CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 2031.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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the creation by statute of the general rule of compulsion. 2 But
though the privilege was thus early established, the theory upon
which it rested was not finally settled until near the beginning of
the eighteenth century, with the result that the scope and conditions
of the privilege were not settled until after the middle of the nineteenth century.27 Moreover, the rationale of the privilege as adopted
in the eighteenth century was a priori and incomplete, in that it
took what is only one of the factors on which is based the policy
supporting the privilege as the total justification for the privilege.
As a result of the acceptance of this more limited raison d'etre, the
privilege has failed to withstand the logical attacks of the able analysts
of the modern law of evidence.2"
At the early common law, the privilege belonged to the attorney
entirely - it was a matter of honor which he should not be required
to violate. He was thus free to disclose the communication or to
decline, as he saw fit. 9 This was a natural carry-over from the time
when the attorney was ethically bound to secrecy and could not be
required to reveal his client's communications, because he could not
be required to testify at all unless he chose to do so. The leaders at
the bar constituted an ancient and honorable class, the upper reaches
of which merged in the peerage. The attorney or solicitor did not
stand so high. He was not a gentleman but was a man of business
and the obedient servant of the family whose property and affairs
he managed. As the sense of honor was adequate to exempt the
barrister from being asked questions touching his dignity, there was
an equally old and powerful feeling that a servant must keep his
master's secrets, and the attorney was generally in that class, though
not a servant in the specific sense which English law attaches to
that term.30
As Professor Radin has pointed out,3 1 the duty of loyalty of

the servant was not only obvious but also had authority to sustain it.
Under Roman law, a servant (who was also a slave) might not give
testimony against his master. The rule was the same for parents and
26. IX HOLDSWORTH 201-02.
27. Id. 202.
28. For a good recent criticism, reminiscent of Bentham, see Morgan, Foreword
TO THE MODEL CODE OV EVIDENcE 22-31 (Am. L. Inst. 1942), discussing the personal privileges.
29. There were two other consequences: the privilege lasted only for the
duration of the particular case, and the client might be compelled to answer by a
bill in equity. When the basis for the privilege changed, the client could no longer
be reached in equity, first as to the particular case; later, as to any instance. See
VIII WIGMORE §§ 2294 at 564, 2324.
30. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CALiF. L. Rrv. 487 (1928) (hereinafter cited as Radin).
31. Id. 487-88.
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children, patrons and freedmen, and in criminal cases a long list of
others.82 Advocates from ancient times could not be called as witnesses against their clients while the case was in progress. By later
imperial mandate they were made incompetent to testify at all in
such cases.83 That the Roman precedent was the source of the
English rule cannot be proved. The better view is that it may have
had some influence, even on the theory of the barrister's honor, but
the various factors heretofore indicated, in the setting of the period
of the origin of the modern English law, must have all contributed to
the establishment of the attorney-client privilege as a lasting development. Professor Radin maintains that from the late eighteenth century,
the privilege in English law has been sustained upon the theory of
the attorney's duty of loyalty to the client.3 4 While this has been an
important if generally unarticulated premise, there have been others
no less important. The composite whole of those factors (in combination) resulted in the development of the English common law trial
process as adversary in nature. This, together with the mode of proof
established for the production of evidence by witnesses in open
court, generally to be evaluated by a jury, and with numerous safeguards (real or supposed) against false and misleading evidence, was
the source of the origin and continuation of the privilege.
With the perfection of the modern mode of trial, by evaluation
of the evidence produced in open court, plus the use of compulsory
processes against witnesses in general when necessary to obtain their
testimony, it was no longer possible to exempt the attorney as a
witness on the basis of honor alone.3 5 Other people had honor and
were forced to violate confidences by compulsory process of the courts.
32. Ibid.
33. Id. 489. The basis of the exclusion was the general moral duty not to violate
the underlying fides on which the family was built, but the rationalization of the
rule was that the testimony was valueless either for or against the litigant (when
favorable, there was strong motive for misstatement; when against, the litigant
was unworthy of belief). At Rome, the public policy which supported the privilege
was directed against the corruption of the family (or quasi-family) relations which
would result if the fullest confidence of the members was not maintained. This
policy was deemed superior to that which sought the correct settlement of controversies or the punishment of offenders, with the exception of treason. Id. 491-92.
34. Id. 492. The writer would qualify this by saying that the duty of loyalty
has been at least an important factor in the recognition of the privilege as a policy
at variance with the policy favoring the production of all available evidence.
35. Professor Radin suggests that the attorney's honor might yet be the better
basis for the privilege (pundoner). This would leave the attorney free to speak
if he should choose. Thus, reputable clients and attorneys would be fully protected,
but the disreputable client might suffer. So much the better, though in the case
of the disreputable attorney there would be danger of blackmail. Radin does not
consider this a great danger, however, as the bar could deal with disreputable
attorneys. Id. 493-94. The writer suggests that not only would there be danger of
blackmail, but the public would fear the treachery of the legal profession, and this
would cause more harm than any actual blackmail.
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Moreover, by the time of the eighteenth century, the rationalists were
requiring the justification of the various legal rules and doctrines;
and in order to place the privilege on a sound rational basis, it became necessary to justify it on stronger grounds of policy than
loyalty alone or to discard it altogether.3

The eighteenth century has been described as the century of reason; the nineteenth century, as the century of experience; and the
twentieth century, as the century of intuition." In the eighteenth
century, the great social movement which was to produce modern
notions of humanitarianism and a whole new scheme of values was
only beginning to take shape in men's minds in the form of new
ideals.3 The nineteenth century was a reaction from the unbridled
reason of the eighteenth century and a period of consolidation of prior
gains. The twentieth century has the work and experience of the
two previous centuries of progress on which to build, plus new discoveries pertaining to the nature of man, discoveries which indicate
that a thing may be of perceived value without being exactly explicable
in terms of reason and experience alone.3 9 But in the eighteenth century all of this necessarily lay in the future. The schemes of the
rationalists had not yet faced the test of experience. To borrow a
phrase from Justice Frankfurter, "the compendious expression for
all those rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic
to our free society" 40 was an ideal which was only beginning to take
shape. Today's world was beginning to emerge from its chrysalis
but was only in its first stages of scientific and humanitarian development. Modern society was still too close to its primitive origins to
36. VIII WIGMooZ § 2290 at 547-50. The matter was finally settled in the

Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586 (1776), which held that the

honor of the attorney was no ground for refusal to testify. The "point of honor"

thus disappeared forever as a basis for the privilege, but its expiration was viewed
with reluctance by many. VIII WIGmol § 2286 at 536. In the 1700's the point of
honor carried so much weight that it almost succeeded in obtaining the creation of
other privileges. The new theory began to appear in the early 1700's and the

two were co-existent for a time. Id. § 2290 at 548.
37. Roscoe Pound, General Introduction to SIMPSON AND STONE, CASES AND
READINGS ON LAW AND SOCIETY xvii (1948), where Dean Pound expresses it thus:
"In jurisprudence we are dealing with experience developed by reason and reason

tested by experience. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries put their faith in

reason. The nineteenth century, in the main line of its thought, put its faith in
experience. The twentieth century has been putting its faith in intuition." The
phrase "experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience" is the
essence of Pound's conception of the judicial empiricism of the common law tradition
and is frequently repeated in his various writings. E.g.: Nxw PATHS OP THE LAW
13 (1950) ; THE TASK OF LAW 62 (1944). In fact, it is reflected in the title of

one of his most recent books, LAW FINDING THROUGH
(1960). And see generally, CARDOZO, THE NATURE O' THE

REASON AND EXPERIENCE
JUDICIAL PROCESS

(1921).

38. See WHIT8HEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD Chs. I-IV (1925).
39. See the reference to "reason and experience" made by Dean Pound, supra,
note 37.
40. Frankfurter, J., speaking for the majority in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,

27 (1949).
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attempt to execute its finer ideals. For example, the judicial sanction
of torture had been abolished for only a century.41
Eighteenth century rationalism resulted in the notion that the
silence of the attorney was necessary in order that the client might
trust his legal advisor more fully. The attorney's freedom from
compulsion, it was believed, would make the client feel more secure
in disclosing to counsel, freely and without fear, all of his knowledge
of the case. It was of course apparent that the attorney must have
this information readily available in order to properly prepare and
present the client's case. This is the first essential step in the
administration of justice in an adversary system of trial of cases.
Men recognized that society has an interest in the fair administration of justice and that the fact-finding process in adversary litigation
can be accurately administered only when the lawyer involved is
entirely familiar with his client's cause. This requires that the
client should have confidence in his attorney and that the attorney
should be free to keep the client's secrets inviolate. Originally, the
protection of the privilege covered only situations in which the
attorney was consulted for purposes of litigation which did in fact
take place; but the coverage was extended in the nineteenth century to
include all cases where legal advice was sought for any purpose,42
and this is within the sound policy of the privilege.4"
As a result of the law reform movement during the latter part
of the nineteenth century, discovery procedures were improved and
extended so as to cover all relevant and unprivileged materials in
the possession of the parties, and under special circumstances in
the possession of third parties. This liberal discovery was contrary
to traditional procedures favoring secrecy, as has been indicated
previously. The reform of discovery came as the result of a growing
feeling that to insure justice to all it is necessary that technicalities
which prevent the production of all relevant evidence should be abolished.44 This feeling led to the simplification of the rules of evidence
41. This took place in the seventeenth century.

See IX HOLDSWORTH 230.

42. VIII WIGMORE § 2294 at 563-65 and cases cited.
43. This is true in theory at least. Moreover, the rules of evidence which
prevent the complete disclosure of all relevant evidence rest on some ground of
policy rather than (as was earlier believed to be the case) that disclosure was in
conflict with other proper modes of trial (IX HOLDSWORTH 193-94); or that it
might result in perjury which would mislead the jury.
The rationale of the broader rule (extending privilege to client's communications
for advice not resulting in litigation) is the fostering of complete freedom in the
non-litigation area. This is important as tending to prevent litigation from developing.
VIII WIGMORE § 2295 at 568.
44. For a good philosophical consideration of the justification of compulsory
discovery in its broadest phases, see VI WIGMOR §§ 1845-46.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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and the elimination of many rules which interfered with the ascertainment of the facts during a trial.4 5
Today, it is generally recognized that except in certain situations
where a party is not bound by the testimony of his witness46 or
where a party has some good basis for understanding what testimony
he can expect his witness to give in advance of the witness's taking
the stand, the witness should not be called to testify. 7 The best
method for ascertaining this information was formerly the personal
interview, but under present day conditions, the best method is generally found to be the oral deposition, preceded by an interview when
practicable.4" In former times, perhaps the task of interviewing
witnesses was relatively easy, but in our complex modern society
this is not generally the case unless the witness is in some way
interested in the outcome of the litigation. For this reason, it is
considered to be a sound practice to take the deposition of a prospective witness in advance of trial if this is permitted under the
local rules, both for the purpose of discovery (that is, the ascertainment of what he can be expected to say), 49 and perpetuation
of his testimony, so that if anything happens to the witness, his
evidence will be available; also, incidentally, for protection in two
other respects: (1) if the prospective witness knows that his story
has been taken down, he is less likely to change it; and (2) if he
should change it, counsel can claim surprise and use the witness's
prior deposition to impeach his testimony in open court.
However, in view of the comparatively early reform of English
procedure in regard to discovery and perpetuation of testimony,5"
the courts protected certain areas of knowledge from disclosure to
a greater extent than they would today if faced with the problem
for the first time. This was in part due to the fact that novel ideas
are always dealt with in conservative manner. But there were more
important reasons. These derived from two sources: (1) English
45. That is, as compared to the time of reform in American procedure. There
is still much work to be done, and this paper is only a small facet of it.
46. For the reason why one was held bound by the testimony of his witnesses
at common law, see IX HOLDSWORrH 208-09.
47. Put another way, generally speaking, a party should not call a witness
or ask one on the stand a question unless he knows in advance what the answer
will be.
48. Under open discovery, the direction of written interrogatories to the opponent has become a popular method of ascertaining the opponent's knowledge of the
facts of the case and the sources of evidence. The discovery of witnesses' statements taken by the opponent's agent other than his counsel is now becoming important under the American practice, but is not available under the English practice
when such statements were taken in preparation for trial.
49. This has two aspects: What the witness knows about what his opponent
already knows and what he may know that the opponent does not know but would

like to ascertain.
50. See note 6 ante.
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discovery procedures by bill in equity, from which the attorney
always remained free; and (2) the solicitor-barrister division in the
legal profession, with its resultant effect on the mode of trial preparation. 5 As to the second item, it must always be borne in mind that
the privilege developed in the context of litigation is in an adversary
system. And at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the privilege
was still limited in scope to those instances in which the client had
made the communications to counsel in anticipation of litigation or
at least when the very real possibility of litigation was the motivating
factor. In those instances, the client's communications to the solicitor
were reduced to writing by the latter and incorporated in a brief
which would be laid before the barrister first for his advice in regard
to litigation and later for the barrister's assistance in connection with
preparation of his case in court. Such a brief would obviously have
been most valuable to the opponent, but the tradition and feelings of
the English bar were strongly opposed to its being made available to
the opponent, and its production through the use of pretrial discovery devices was to be repeatedly denied. This brief of the solicitor
is protected both by the personal immunity accorded to the lawyer
not to be required to testify (or to produce his brief) and by the
recognition of a privilege of the client not to disclose his communications to counsel.

As to the first item, it must be understood that while the client
could not be a witness in his own behalf in the common law courts,
he could always be examined on deposition in equity by the opponent
as to the facts which were not immune from pretrial discovery. The
attorney, however, could not be examined by bill in equity, but he
could be examined like any other witness in the common law courts,
and he could be examined on deposition under the liberal discovery
procedures. Yet, since he could not be examined as to privileged
matters, the question as to the scope of the privilege had to be resolved. A privilege for the client's communications was recognized
when these communications were made in anticipation of litigation.
Hence, it was recognized that the attorney could not be examined as
to such communications when made by the client under circumstances
such that litigation might reasonably be contemplated. In this respect,
the courts adopted an objective test.
This was the situation in England during the early part of the
nineteenth century. Yet, the circumstances were not favorable to
51. In England the solicitor "makes a case for counsel" and in so doing prepares
written documents and sets forth the evidence in written form; while in the
United States, the client discusies his case orally with the attorney who will take

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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such narrow confinement of the privilege. The attorney's distaste for
personal involvement in his client's affairs was undoubtedly an unarticulated factor in these circumstances. The nineteenth century
rationale of privilege'la did not justify the distinction between communications made by the client for professional advice which was
sought for the purpose of conducting his affairs generally and communications made by the client in order to determine his course with
respect to litigation, actual or prospective. The protection of the
privilege was as justifiable in the former instance as it was in the
latter one. Hence, the extension of the privilege to cover all communications made by the client to his counsel in the course and scope of
the professional relationship was inevitable. Yet this extension took
place only after much travail and turmoil over the period of half a
century. It came in two steps, the first being the recognition of an
immunity of the attorney from compulsion to testify to such communications. Even as to the attorney there was some hesitation, but
by 1833 it was recognized that the attorney could not be required to
disclose the client's communications made in the course and scope of
the professional relationship, whether made in anticipation of litigation or solely to enable the attorney to furnish legal advice.5" The
client could still be required to testify as to such communications,
however. The extension of the same immunity to the client as the
attorney now enjoyed passed through a tardily similar stage of legal
idevelopment,

and the point"

continued to be argued until the

decision of Minet v. Morgan, in 1873.54 Thereafter, the client's communications were fully protected from disclosure by either the lawyer
or the client. 5
The area covered by the privilege was further extended how56
ever.
The "case made for counsel" and sent from solicitor to
51a. Hereinafter referred to as the Wigmore rationale, not because Wigmore
originated it but because he was the last great writer on the law of evidence who
after considering it affirmed it without question.
52. The leading English case on the privilege is Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Myl.
& K. 80, 102, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (1833), where Lord Brougham made this statement:
"If, touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional employment, they [legal advisers] receive a communication in their professional capacity,
either from a client or on his account, and for his benefit in the transaction of
his business, or, which amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the
course of their employment on his behalf, matters which they know only through
their professional relation to the client, they are not only justified in withholding
such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose
the information or produce the papers in any court of law or equity, either as a
party or as a witness."
53. That is, the client's freedom from compulsion to testify.

54. L. R. 8 Ch. 361, 366.
55. This controversy did not echo in the United States, and here the courts
gravitated naturally to the largest interpretation of the privilege. VIII WIGMORA

§ 2294 at 563-65.

56. Wheeler v. LeMarchant, [1881] L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 675, 681, held that documents prepared by third persons are protected from discovery "where they have
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barrister was eagerly sought after by bill of discovery. This solicitor's
brief included not only the record of the client's communications but
also the record of the solicitor's preparations. The former are communications by the client, and they are privileged as such. The latter
are not of the same nature and hence are not entitled to the claim
of privilege by virtue of the nineteenth century rationale. Yet, the
English courts accorded similar protection to these preparations. There
already existed the tradition which protected the lawyer from discovery in equity of evidence acquired in professional confidence (in
anticipation of litigation). The attorney's knowledge was imputable
to the client, however, and thus could be discovered through procedures directed to the client. But the courts refused to permit this,
though discovery was frequently sought during this period.
A bill in equity was nearly always sought before litigation
was ventured. This resulted in resistance to the claim of privilege by
advocates in need of proof, and the converse efforts on the part of the
legal profession to extend the protection of the privilege. The many
English rulings resulted from demands of the client to protect this
"key to his case."5 7 Both the client's communications and the lawyer's
investigations were generally lumped together and held privileged.
Yet, discriminating judges have recognized the latter as a distinct
category of evidence which is immune under a distinct but related
privilege. The general failure to distinguish these two categories, together with the sharp contests and the fine discriminations in the
English rulings tended to make this area a prolific source of litigation,
though today the decisions tend to turn largely on factual interpretations. This state of affairs did not exist in the United States, where the
relation between the attorney and his client was direct and their
communications generally oral. The documents which the client
come into existence after litigation commenced or in contemplation, and when
they have been made with a view to litigation, either for the purpose of obtaining
evidence to be used in such litigation or of obtaining information which might
lead to the obtaining of such evidence."
Lyell v. Kennedy, [1883] L. R. 9 App. Cas. 81, 87, 93, held that documents
obtained by the defendant "at the instigation of a solicitor" "for the purpose of
defending himself against various claimants" and placed in his solicitor's hands
are privileged; and the court went on to say: "[A] collection of records may be
the result of professional knowledge, research and skill; it is the solicitor's mind,
if that be so, which has collected the materials; . . . you cannot have disclosure of
them without asking for the key to the labor which the solicitor has bestowed in
obtaining them."
The solution worked out in England and followed in some American courts is
to allow discovery of agents' reports generally but to recognize here a privilege
not peculiar to agents' reports - the privilege against disclosure of papers made
or compiled by or for a litigant or his counsel as part of the special preparation of
a lawsuit. The same rule applies in Canada. McCart v. McCart, [1939] 3 D. L. R.
777 (Ontario) (detective reports relating to proof of adultery obtained for counsel).

Other cases are cited in VIII WICMORP § 2319 n. 1.
57. Id. § 2294 at 566.
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transmitted to counsel would not be privileged in any event.5" The
extracted oral statement was of little value compared to the unchangeable writing existing under the English practice. Thus, there
was no long drawn out struggle such as occurred in England. 9
In England the courts went so far as to extend the privilege
to cover all preparation of the atttorney for trial, including freedom
from discovery of statements of witnesses who were independent
third parties.60 The legal climate in which the broad recognition of
privilege under reformed English practice developed deserves mention. Though the privilege had an early origin, many points were
not finally settled until the middle of the nineteenth century,"' during
58. VIII WIGMoR § 2307. This is a point frequently not well understood by
counsel today. Only documents which originate as communications to counsel are
privileged. Pre-existing documents have no better claim to such protection than
evidence in general. If the rule were otherwise, all documentary evidence in the
possession of the parties would become privileged simply by being transmitted to
counsel. This would not only be unnecessary to the effective communication of the
client with counsel but would not meet the test of confidentiality which is basic to the
inception of a personal privilege.
59. Id. § 2294 at 567.
60. E.g.: Ankin v. London & N.E.R. Co., [1930] 1 K.B. 527 (documents taken
from defendant's officers and third parties for solicitor in litigation held to be
privileged); Norton v. Defries, [1882] L. R. 8 Q.B.D. 508 (shorthand notes taken
by defendant in another action between the same parties touching the same subject and in part for subsequent litigation held privileged) ; Wheeler v. LeMarchant,
[1881] L. R. 17, Ch. Div. 675, 681 (report of surveyor to solicitor for purpose
of enabling him to advise client held not privileged, but court said that it would be
privileged if made with view to litigation); M'Corquodale v. Bell, [1876] L. R.
1 C.P.D. 471 (communication by representative of a third person to plaintiff's
solicitor held privileged as document obtained with view to litigation); Walsham
v. Stainton, [1863] 2 Hem. & M. 1, 71 Eng. Rep. 140 (where solicitor obtains help
of another in order to give advice, here accountant, the matter is privileged);
Curling v. Perring, [1835] 2 Myl. & K. 380, 39 Eng. Rep. 989 (motion for production of correspondence between solicitor and third party refused). See also: 4
MOORE 1126.23 [2] at 1090 et seq.; VIII WIGMOR §§ 2317-19.
Until recently the American courts have tended to follow the English example
uncritically, though there is now developing a tendency to re-examine the matter
in the light of new attitudes toward discovery. In fact, until the advent of our
liberal discovery principles, it was often difficult to tell whether a court denying discovery was basing its decision on the absence of a right to discovery of the moving
party or the assertion of a privilege by the opponent. The two principles were
frequently confused. See VIII WIGMORt §§ 2318-19.
61. Id. § 2290 at 548. As a consequence of its tardy origin, the detailed rules of
the privilege were still formative during the first half of the 1800's and the
precedents often contained overtones of the older notion of attorney's honor long
after its repudiation, thus resulting in a confused volume of rulings. Ibid.
The only limitation on the English rule of privilege is that the information must
have been gathered for the purpose of litigation or with the possibility of litigation
in mind or in order to obtain legal advice thereon. What amounts to such a
contingency depends upon the facts of the particular case, and the courts have
not been entirely consistent in where they have drawn the line. Routine reports
not primarily for legal advice or litigation are not privileged, but documents may
be privileged though brought into existence for more than one purpose if primarily
for a legal purpose. Here again the courts have had difficulty in drawing the line.
It is questionable as to whether the recognition of an immunity for such dual
purpose documents is sound, because they fail to meet the prerequisite test of
confidentiality (required before the privilege will be accorded). The point has been
most effectively made in Comment, Agents' Reports and the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 21 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 752 (1954). The only question here is whether we
should require the same high degree of confidentiality for documents which are in
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which period the new rules of discovery were put into effect. Moreover, at that time there were still rules of incompetency which had
great vitality, and the privilege itself did not seem to be so great an
obstacle to the discovery of the approximate truth when considered
together with these additional obstructions to the discovery of truth.6 2
Also, the parties were now being allowed to testify for the first time at
the trial, and much of the earlier pressure for the attorney's examination was automatically removed - since the client could be compelled to testify directly to what the attorney could only testify that
63
he had learned from the client.

The rule of attorney-client privilege was basically very simple:
that the communications of the client to the attorney were privileged
when the consultation was for the purpose of litigation which did in
fact occur.6 4 During the pre-modern era, most consultations between
attorney and client undoubtedly occurred in connection with litigation.
When consultation for purposes of legal advice became more frequent, the privilege was naturally extended to cover such communications. By 1833, the privilege had been extended to cover communications made by the client to the attorney, either in connection
with litigation or for the purpose of obtaining legal advice sought for
any lawful purpose. Both the attorney and the client were now protected from compulsory disclosure, though the client could still be
examined by bill in equity.65 It was not until 1873 that the client
was fully protected (both at law and in equity), and thereafter the
boundaries of the privilege for attorney and client each remained
the nature of preparatory materials

(sometimes described as in the nature of

"work product," being protected from discovery by a quasi-privilege). On this
point see Symposium, Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. Riv.

940, 1045 (1961).
The leading English case of Westminster Airways, Ltd. v. Kuwait Oil Co.,
[1951] K.B. 134, 22 A.L.R. 2d 648 (communication between insured and his broker
after it became clear that plaintiff would file suit held privileged), did not involve a
third party situation; hence, it is not cited in the first paragraph of note 60. To
separate business items which end up in the lawyer's office from legal items, the
English courts emphasize the time element. This however is an artificial test, which
is illustrated by the rule that communications made to obtain legal advice are
privileged though litigation never in fact takes place. The difficulty comes in the
area outside of the actual communications of the clients to their lawyers. What
transpires directly or through agents after litigation has begun or is threatened
may have the protection of the privilege though it is in fact only routine business
correspondence. In theory, however, such communications must be made in contemplation of litigation or with the idea of litigation as the motivating factor. (This,
however, the writer submits is not enough to bring the immunity of the quasiprivilege into play.) Wigmore pointed out in 1940 that the English courts do not
have a definitive decision on privilege, and this remains true today. VIII WIGMORt
§ 2319 at 622-23.
62. The subject is covered in II WIGMOR4 § 483 et seq.
63. See VIII WIGMOR4 § 2291 at 557.
64. Id. § 2290 at 549.
65. The attorney could not be examined, however. See text at note 53, ante.
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the same.66 Put another way, in the area of communications by the
client to the attorney, neither could be compelled to disclose more or
less than the other. The privilege of the late common law period
thus continued to be limited to what might be described as a "faceto-face situation," and was thus quite narrow in scope. It was circumscribed by the principle of "the face-to-face relationship," namely,
that only communications made in confidence by the client to the
attorney for purposes of obtaining legal advice should be protected
from disclosure through compulsory process of law. Thus, what the
client might say in a personal interview with his solicitor was
privileged. The advice which the solicitor gave, based on the facts
related by the client, was also privileged.'
This, however, was not to
protect the lawyer or to satisfy his desire for either secretiveness or the
maintenance of his personal honor untarnished." s Rather, it was the
theory that disclosure of the attorney's advice might give a clue
as to what the client had said to the attorney.69 At one time the scope
of the privilege was no broader than that.
Yet the growth of the privilege did not stop at that point. The
privilege had a tendency to expand in its coverage from the beginning. From the face-to-face situation, the scope of the privilege
was next broadened to cover the attorney's clerk (as a matter of
convenience). 7" The clerk's knowledge of the client's communications,
acquired through his personal presence at the interview or by reason
of his work on the case in the lawyer's office, would not be subject
to compulsory disclosure; otherwise, the facility of consultation would
be reduced, and the subsequent preparation might also suffer. 7' Next,
the client's agent was covered, 72 so that the client would be able to
send a written or oral message to his attorney, and this is undoubtedly reasonable under any policy which is designed to make
the privilege easily available to clients in general.
66. VIII WGMORE § 2294; see text at note 54, ante; see VIII WIGMORE
§ 2295 as to rationale; also, note 43, ante.
The privilege does not extend to advice sought for non-legal purposes. But
a matter committed to a legal adviser is prima facie for legal purposes. It is not
always easy to distinguish the two situations. See United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
67. When the privilege had been conceived as based on the honor of the
attorney, it had not protected the client from discovery by a bill in equity. VIII
WIGMORU § 2294 at 563, § 2290 at 548.
68. Id. § 2317 at 615.
69. Id. § 2320 at 625; see MCCORMICK § 93 at 186-87.
70. VIII WIGMORF

§ 2301

at 584.

71. But their presence must be reasonably necessary. Gariepy v. United States,
189 F. 2d 549 (6th Cir. 1951); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F. 2d 924
(9th Cir. 1949) (presence of accountant in tax fraud case held not indispensable). The
case has been criticized by the tax bar. See 10 TAx L. REv. 227, 233 (1954).
VIII WIcMoRx
§ 2317
at 616-17.
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The English courts have gone much further than this however.
They have extended the "privilege" to cover all preparation of the
client which could reasonably be found to have been made with the
possibility of litigation in mind,7 3 although it might also have been
made for other purposes; and all investigations of the attorney even
though they were routine and might have been made by anyone,
when such investigations were of the nature of conversation or written communications with third parties, or consisted of the actual
collection of information for the attorney by an agent of either the
client or the attorney.74 The American courts seem never to have
gone quite so far, but the limited discovery procedures of the last
one hundred years make it difficult to say just how far they did go. 7 5
Moreover, since the adoption of the federal rules in 1938, the trend
in this country has been to some extent to reduce the broad area
of coverage which has hitherto been recognized, at least in the
7
peripheral areas. 6
73. It should be pointed out that this is only a test of the applicability of the
privilege in litigation-type situations. It obviously could not be more, because consultations are privileged when legal advice is sought without the possibility of litigation
in mind. See discussion in text following note 64, ante; see also VIII WIGMOR4
§ 2319 (2) at 622.
This "spurious privilege situation" results from attempts to extend the protection
to reports and preparations of the client's agents in litigation-type situations where
the agents are not merely conduits between the client and the attorney but are
creating or gathering independent evidence which the opponent seeks to obtain by
discovery. In the case of the client alone or the agent as mere conduit, the problem
does not arise. This inherent self-contradiction therefore suggests that (aside from
consideration of principles and policy) the privilege has been extended out beyond
the limits of the area where it can be utilized with facility, by prompt and obvious
rulings, as the problems arise. (This is sometimes referred to as "the Thayer
Principle." See note 120 and text at notes 208-10, post.)
74. Loc. cit. notes 60 and 61, ante. There is only one instance in which the
privilege is not equally broad for the attorney as for the client: Communications
between solicitors and non-professional agents or third parties is limited to cases
where litigation is actual or anticipated. There is no such limitation in the case of
the client. See 12 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 40-49, esp. 44-46 (3d ed. 1955);
WILLS, EVIDXNCZ 281 (3d ed. 1938). The expanded area of the privilege, which
covers materials gathered in preparation for trial, has been described as quasiprivilege in England.
75. See VIII WIGMORX § 2319, § 2294 at 566-67. In the United States, the
courts have failed to perceive the distinction between privilege and quasi-privilege
and have extended the former to cover some of the materials acquired in preparation
for trial (where the clients' agents or the attorneys' agents have been the "factgatherers"). More recently, this expansion of the classical privilege has been restricted by some courts and a qualified immunity granted to the lawyer for
preparatory materials gathered by him or his assistants. This has been described as
"the work product of the lawyer."
76. E.g.: Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (statement of attorney
taken as investigator held not privileged but subject to qualified immunity which
could not be destroyed without showing of good cause) ; Dowell v. Superior Court,
47 Cal. 2d 483, 304 P. 2d 1009 (1956) (inspection of party's own statement allowed;
court noted trend toward liberal discovery); Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d
500, 267 P. 2d 1025 (1954) (investigator's report, including driver's statement and
photographs, held privileged; inspection of party's own statement allowed) ; Schmitt
v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W. 2d 413 (1942) (statement taken by claims agent
employed by bus company from bus driver concerning accident, obtained in anticipation
of litigation upon direction of attorneys and delivered to attorneys, held privileged) ; 22
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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In England, by reason of the statutes governing disclosure
(which entitle each party to discovery of all documents and information in the possession of the opponent), discovery of the knowledge
of the parties, including statements of the witnesses in their possession,
has rarely been denied except on the grounds of privilege.17 This has
made it necessary in each lawsuit to separate ordinary business documents from documents prepared for the purpose of litigation. There
has been substantial dispute in this area, where different inferences
can be drawn from the application of the law to the facts. Generally,
however, the line has been drawn liberally in favor of the privilege.
For example, the concept of privilege has been carried so far that it
has been held to protect. the client from compulsory disclosure if he
obtained a statement for the use of his solicitor in proceedings pending
or anticipated, even though he obtained the statement for other purposes and intended to settle the matter, if possible, without resort to
a solicitor."8 This investigatory privilege, sometimes designated as
quasi-privilege in order to distinguish it from the classical or true
privilege, was thus extended to cover all materials and information
obtained by the party or his attorney after it became apparent that
litigation might develop. 7sa The need for the freedom of the solicitor
Cote v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 160 Misc. 658, 660, 290 N.Y. Supp. 483 (1936)
(holding report privileged only if attorney-client relationship existed at time of
delivery to insurer); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E. 2d 352
(1943) (report not privileged because prepared in course of business, but case
represents liberal trend in construction); Tomek v. Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
268 Wis. 566, 68 N.W. 2d 573 (1955) (information obtained in investigation by
attorney held not privileged; statute limits privilege to transactions with client).
See also: Notes, 139 A.L.R. 1250 (1942) (privilege as applicable to communications between attorney and client's agent); 146 A.L.R. 977 (1943)
(report by
agent to principal in regard to matters afterwards in litigation as privileged); 22
A.L.R. 2d 659 (1951)
(reports from insured to insurer as privileged); 73 A.L.R.
2d 12, esp. 84-100, 133-42 (1960) (statements of parties or witnesses as subject to
pre-trial or other disclosure, production or inspection); Comment, Agents Reports
and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 21 U. Cai. L. Rxv. 752 (1954) ; 4 MooRH
26.23
[2] at 1090 et seq.; VIII WIGMORt §§ 2317-19; McCORMICK § 100.
77. But there are still anomalies in the English precedents. E.g.: In re Holloway,
[1887] L. R. 12 Prob. Div. 167 (Eng.). Anonymous letters received by plaintiff
were held not privileged, but anonymous letters received by her attorney were held
privileged. This decision can be rationalized, however, if the privilege is conceded
to the attorney's preparation, as it is in England under the label of quasi-privilege.
78. Ogden v. London Electric R. Co., [1933] 149 LTns (Eng.) 476 C.A.
This case might be said to constitute the furthest limits of the extension of the
quasi-privilege. See also cases cited in note 60 ante; and 166 A.L.R. 1429,
1440-41 (1947).
78a. See Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, 11876] L.R. 2 Ch. Div. C.A., esp. opinion by Jessel, M.R. which gives the clearest discussion of the distinction between privilege and quasi-privilege. The writer would designate this
as the great English case on privilege. Compare Greenough v. Gaskell, [1833]
1 Myl. & K. 80, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (note 52 ante), which loosely lumps the two
categories together. This failure to distinguish quasi-privilege from the classical
or communications privilege may have resulted in some confusion in the decisions
themselves. It has certainly caused misunderstanding in the United States, where
in many jurisdictions only the communications privilege is recognized, of the
precedential value of the English decisions.
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to prepare his case without fear of discovery of the materials which
he gathered in advance of the trial was recognized. The quasiprivilege had its origin in this felt need. The extension to his agents
followed naturally, due to the limited capacity of the solicitor to
conduct a large volume of preparation when his services were in
demand. The extension of the quasi-privilege to cover the client
and his agents, however, was the result of a fiction that the client
was the agent of the attorney for the purpose of making investigations
which the latter would make personally if circumstances permitted it.
The result has been to throw a blanket immunity around the preparatory materials of litigation in England, and this has undoubtedly
off-set the advantage to accuracy in fact-finding that has resulted from
the tendency of the English courts to interpret the classical privilege
narrowly. It cannot be doubted that the solicitor-barrister division
of the litigation process in England has been an important factor in
this manner of treatment. Also, a philosophy of trial strategy which
considers the "surprise element" an important value to be preserved
has had its influence.
As a result of differences in legal history which have just been
discussed, the development of the basic principles of our law of
privilege came full blown, based largely on English precedents. But in
the United States, liberal discovery did not in practice have any
great significance, and consideration of certain problems in fringe
areas was not forced upon the courts until more recently. Moreover,
a tendency to equate the scope of the privilege with the scope of the
area of materials free from discovery has frequently led to confusion,
unreliability of precedent, unjust expansion of the privilege, and
opposition to liberal construction of discovery statutes and more
comprehensive remedial legislation at each step.79 Nor has Wigmore
79. The courts have been conservative in interpreting the rules of liberal discovery in America. Thus, in Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W. 2d
645 (1946), under a statute which allows discovery of "evidence material to any
matter involved in the action," the court refused to allow inspection of plaintiff's
statement and third party witnesses' statements obtained by defendant's investigators.
The court based its decision on the theory that these items would not be admissible
on behalf of plaintiff except for purposes of impeachment.
The denial of discovery has also been put on the ground that discovery extended only to matters material and necessary to plaintiff's case and did not extend
to the opponent's case.
The general rule in the United States has thus far refused discovery of reports and witnesses' statements of the opponent, and when liberal discovery has
been so broadened as to completely eliminate this restriction, the courts have
fallen back upon the privilege as a defense. In the case of the federal courts, a
"qualified immunity" was created to achieve this result.
There is a paradox in the assignment of the hearsay rule as the reason for
denial of discovery. This rule is designed to make the trial more accurate by
keeping out misleading information, but in this instance it is used as a justification
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
for denying access to information which would make the trial more accurate.

24

Gardner: A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (Part I)
SPRING

19631

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

been so keen in perception of analytic principles or so critical of
exclusionary rules and precedents in this area as he has been in
general. We are now in a new stage of development, forced upon us
by the recent institution of rules of ultimate liberality for the discovery of evidence."0 The new developments are largely concerned
with the degree and scope of protection to be accorded to agents of
the client and agents of the attorney. A question yet to be adequately faced is that of the applicability of the privilege to the modern
corporation, particularly in the light of the altered status of the large
or quasi-public corporation, and the applicability of the privilege to
governmental bodies and public agencies. Another question pertains.
to the scope of the protection which should be accorded to the individual's right to privacy, which is threatened with invasion from
new and dangerous quarters in the form of modern scientific devices,
against which the individual is helpless. This, however, is a part
of the larger problem of infringement on individual freedom.
Wigmore, who favors the privilege, acknowledges that "[i]ts
benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and
concrete."'" The privilege can only be justified by underlying principles which support the policy that is recognized and enforced through
the rules of law which taken altogether constitute the privilege as an
area of substantive law - which, however, is generally thought of
as adjective law, because of its juxtaposition to and interrelation
with the divers aspects of production of evidence in connection with
pretrial and trial procedures. These principles must derive their
life from twentieth century values. To measure the privilege in the
light of these values requires that we should first answer the question
as to whether the privilege can be justified at all in today's world.
This in turn requires the consideration of the preparatory and trial
process in our adversary system of litigation against the background
of our twentieth century scheme of values. If the policy is sound,
then the question arises as to how far the rules, coterminous with
underlying principles, should extend. 2 Consideration of the case law
indicates that it is well settled in most areas of attorney-client privilege. This means that rules and principles are coterminous in these
80. The new system might well be characterized as "open discovery."

An

idealized version of open discovery would mean a system in which all evidence which
is relevant to the subject matter and not privileged should be available to the party

desiring it in advance of trial and without need for first overcoming procedural
impedients.

81. VIII WIGMOo § 2291 at 557.
82. A related question is how "absolute" should the privilege be in the areas
where it is held to exist. Should it be of temporary duration or permanent in

nature? Should it be easily overcome, as by waiver, termination by death, change
of circumstances, hardship, or loss of confidential character?
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areas. Such areas will not require treatment in this paper. But in
areas of current uncertainty, the search for the correct solution is
apparent from a consideration of the many cases which are being
decided by the courts. In this area of current growth and development,
there are new factors to be weighed and decided and earlier precedents
to be re-examined and re-evaluated in the light of recent experience
and current needs. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to
this objective.
B. Policy:
The most devastating attack upon the privilege was made by
the great rationalist philosopher Jeremy Bentham.13 Bentham considered the argument that if there were no privilege, potential litigants would not seek the advice of counsel. His reply may be summed
up as follows: to deter a guilty man from seeking legal advice does
not thwart justice but rather aids it, while the innocent man is not
deterred, as he has nothing to fear by the disclosure of his communications to counsel.8 4 It has been said that this argument "cannot
really be met as long as we keep on the level from which Bentham
views the subject." But this is the level of pure abstraction, and the
matter is not so simple as Bentham makes it appear.8 5 Furthermore,
the context of the privilege in actual practice must be considered.
For example, there may be a greater problem in counsel's obtaining
the whole story once a person has summoned the courage to consult
with counsel.8 6 Then, there is the problem of the client's feelings, the
relation between the client and his lawyer as a counsellor and advocate, and finally, the position of the lawyer in the eyes of the
public. All of these facets of the complex relationship which tends to
develop between the client and his attorney are a part of the larger
83. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, b. IX pt. IV, c. 5, in VII WORKS
474 et seq. (Bowering's ed. 1843) ; quoted in part in VIII WIGMORn § 2291 at
553-55.
84. VIII WIGMORE § 2291 at 555. Bentham considers the arguments supporting
the privilege and answers them as follows: 1. Treachery. Ans. The lawyer is no
more to be charged with betraying his client when required by law to testify than
a close friend would be. 2. When the client has something to hide, he will not
repose trust in his attorney. Ans. True, but the public good will not be better served
by adopting a policy which would cause trust to be reposed in such instances.
3. The lawyer needs accurate knowledge to conduct the case properly. Ans. True,
but if the client is guilty, he cannot complain if he loses the case. 4 Rules of the chase
must be observed. Ans. Yes, if safety of the guilty is the objective. What would be
the advantages resulting from abolition of the privilege, Bentham asks. Ans. There
would be little difference in the evidence available, since clients would seek lawyers of
their own level, but a higher tone of morality would prevail at the bar. Loc. cit.
supra note 83.
85. Radin, op. cit. note 30 at 491.
86. Ibid.
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whole that must be considered in any fair evaluation of the privilege."a
Bentham obviously oversimplified the matter. If Bentham's position
were unassailable, surely it would have had many ardent champions
among the leaders of the bench and bar. Yet this has not been the
case. Generally, the great men of the law have either favored the
privilege or remained uncommitted on the issue. Bentham, Lord
Langdale, and Chief Justice Appleton of Maine were the only eminent
parties in radical opposition to the privilege prior to the twentieth
century. 17 And the rank and file of the legal profession have favored
it strongly, either from a sense of professional pride or the felt need
for its protection of the attorney-client relationship or both.
The modern rationale of the privilege, since the latter part of
the eighteenth century, has been the policy promoting free consultation of clients with their legal advisors.8 " Dean Wigmore accepted
this position and also answered Bentham by raising four objections
to the latter's abstract oversimplification of the problem, to wit :s
1. In civil cases there is often no hard-and-fast line between
guilt and innocence.
2. In most civil cases it does not happen that all of the facts on
one side are wholly right and all of those on the other side are
wholly wrong. There is a mixture on both sides in varying proportions. Both plaintiff and defendant may have fear of disclosing some
part of his case. The party having the better case would be deterred
from seeking legal advice, and this is not good for the administration
of justice.
3. To dfter a wrongdoer from seeking legal advice is not an
unmixed good. It depends upon the ethics of the bar. Counsel can
always decline a case, persuade his client to abandon it, or settle
the case when some moral claim is present. Moreover, if the privilege
were abolished, there are ways in which a guilty party could derive
quite as much assistance from his legal adviser as at present.
4. Contrary to Bentham the consideration of "treachery" is
important. The position of counsel would be most disagreeable if he
were forced to testify against his client. It would be disturbing to
his peace of mind and would create an unhealthy moral state.
Wigmore added two other points: (1) that in criminal cases,
if the privilege were abolished, the prosecution might tend to rely
86a. Professor McCormick adds this point: "The need for such encouragement

[to communication by the client to the attorney as the privilege affords] is understood by lawyers because the problem of the guarded half-truths of the reticent
client is familiar to them in their day to day work." McCoRMIcK 202.
87. VIII WIGMORE

§

2291.

88. Id. § 2291 at 550.
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on defense counsel's testimony to the neglect of other and better
sources of truth, while the defendant would not be deterred from
seeking counsel but rather from disclosing incriminating facts; and
(2) that the loss to truth is comparatively small in modern times,
since the parties themselves can now be examined."
The late Professor Radin deemed that the main argument made
by Professor Wigmore in support of the privilege is that a policy
favoring frank disclosure discourages litigation. 9 Professor Radin
then proceeded to show, by the use of a hypothetical example, that this
result does not necessarily follow from a policy promotive of frank
disclosure. 2 But he found a justification for the privilege in a
broader if more nebulous principle, which can perhaps best be described as the right of the client to command the attorney's loyalty.
Professor Radin stated his rationale of the privilege in the following
language:
The real fact is that, whether we admit it or not, the
Roman and the medieval attitudes are very much in our bones.
We, too, think that the relationships based on mutual fidelity are
valuable constituents of our society and we do not relish the
idea of disturbing them even to aid the processes of formal
justice. And, although we are conscious of lay derision, we
still think of the fraternity of the law as a nobless of the robe,
who are bound by a pundonor and have no few conventional
duties that are not without their influence in facilitating and
smoothing the social functions in which they intervene.9
90. Id. § 2291 at 556, 557. The writer would challenge this last statement in
two areas: (1) corporate and governmental privilege; and (2) agents' reports.
91. Op. cit. note 30 at 491. Wigmore's full disclosure argument has been
answered by Professor Morgan on two occasions: Op. cit. note 28; Suggested
Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. Ct.
L. Rv. 285, 288-90 (1943). Professor Louisell has answered it by the general tenor
of his writings on the subject and in his plea for a new departure. He insists that
the social ethos is the really important factor, that Wigmore's treachery argument
is the best one which he advanced, and that the lawyer's treachery would pervert
the function of counselling. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion:
Privilege in Federal Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. Rev. 101, 112 et passim (1956)
(hereinafter cited as Louisell).
92. Op. cit. note 30 at 491-92. Thus, the client may hold back facts from
counsel notwithstanding the privilege, he may seek another attorney and hold back
facts related to the first attorney, or he may persuade an unethical attorney to take
his case in any event.
A recent case which illustrates this proposition is Maier v. Noonan, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 260, 344 P. 2d 373 (1959). Plaintiff consulted an attorney about bringing
a paternity suit, admitting intercourse with a third party during the relevant period.
Plaintiff brought suit, using a different lawyer, although the particular information
was probably not privileged and thereby risked having it brought out against her in
court. But cf. People v. Singh, 123 Cal. App. 365, 11 P. 2d 73 (1932), in which
an attorney was criticized for testifying against his former client that the client
had suggested bribing the jury (unprivileged communication).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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Finally, Professor Radin considered what would be the result if the
privilege were abolished and the matter left to the compulsory
processes of the law and the ethics of the profession. He concluded
that such a change would make little practical difference; the result
would be much the same as at present. The honorable attorney would
continue to practice law while maintaining principles based on loyalty
and honor, while the dishonest attorney would not take his affirmative duties 94 any more seriously than he now takes his duties when
consulted by clients for the purpose of criminal or tortious activities which they intend to carry on thereafter - and with as little
risk of prosecution. Furthermore, the creation of legal duties not
likely to be effectively enforced would tend to hurt the general moral
tone of the profession9 and thus to bring the private civil law into
disrepute in the community.
The writer agrees with Professor Radin that the idea of "mutual
fidelity" and the honor of a dynamic social organization are important
values in our society. If not the very "woof and warp" of our adversary system of judicial administration, they at least constitute
the foundation upon which the attorney-client relationship rests and
without which it could not exist as a working part of the judicial
system. Lawyers are at worst a class that is in disrepute with a
large part of the public, by the very nature of its occupation, which
in certain respects stirs up and thrives on strife. At their best, lawyers
are the mainstay of our judicial system. Without them, the legal
system as we know it could not operate effectively, and in any
modern system of government in which politico-economic freedom is
treasured, lawyers are essential to keep the system working under
proper tension. The lawyers have played an important role in the
history of western society from the days of the Greeks and the
Romans. They have contributed much to the growth of individual
liberty, often being the bulwark between oppressive policies of state
and the rights of the citizen or subject. In the history of man's long
struggle to attain a higher level of social life and values, lawyers
have fought against state oppression of the individual, have fought
to vindicate individual rights, and have struggled to maintain the
rule of law and to uphold the cause of human dignity in an ever
widening stream. 6 If it should become the practice to call an attorney
94. That is, to voluntarily come forward and testify against his client or at

least to tell the truth when compelled to testify.

95. Op. cit. note 30 at 493-96. Professor Radin suggests that the honor of the
attorney remains an important factor in the preservation of the privilege today.
See note 35 ante.
96. See generally CORWMN, LIB4RTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948.)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 8: p. 279

to the stand and force him to testify against his client, the client
would not only fear to make full and frank disclosure to his counsel in
many instances - he would despise and doubt, rather than trust and
honor his individual attorney, as he generally does at the present
time. 97 Not only would this result in a lowering of the moral tone
of those who are in the profession, but it would cause self-respecting
people to avoid the law as a profession. This would strengthen the
position of the unethical element, and it would cause a general
lowering of ethical standards.
Professor Radin's argument of "mutual fidelity" is closely akin
to and perhaps only a broader statement of Dean Wigmore's treachery
argument. Dean Wigmore's first three arguments actually fall under
one heading, namely, there is generally no open-and-shut case, no
clear-cut instance of black and white, no hard-and-fast line between
guilt and innocence, no case where an honest lawyer cannot exert an
influence for the good of both society and his client. Most cases are
one of a variety of shades of gray, and this is true in criminal cases
as well as civil cases. It is true not only as to the personalities
involved but also as to the factual situations themselves." It is even
true of the law in its unsettled areas and of the application of the
law to the facts when neither the law nor the factual situation is in
dispute. That cases do fall in this "in between" area is what makes
the sense of treachery loom large, because of the large area over which
it has room to roam, if not curbed by some such protective measure
as the privilege affords. On the other hand, it is the sense of treachery
difficulties which would cause the potential litigant to shun the lawyer's
office (and the client to be reluctant to make full disclosure once there).
Thus, these two categories, though separate and distinct, are closely
interrelated and are important factors in the generally felt need for
the protection afforded by the privilege.
The following experience of the writer during his early days
of practice will illuminate the degrees of the gray problem. After he
had practiced for only a short time, the writer expressed his, surprise
to an old and distinguished lawyer that so many intelligent people
could not make an intelligent statement of the facts of a problem
concerning which they sought legal advice. The old lawyer said that
this is frequently the case and that under such circumstances it is the
duty of counsel to determine what the facts are as best he can and
97. See Drinker, Laymen on the Competency and Integrity of Lawyers 7-8
(reprint from TFNN. L. Rev., April 1952).
98. See Comment, Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human
Memory, 108 U. PA. L. Rrv. 59 (1959).
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then tell his client what actually happened.99 This is undoubtedly
proper, though it may take much thought and investigation and
fitting together the pieces of evidence like parts of a jig-saw puzzle.
And this is true even though the client may have been an eyewitness
to some part of the overall situation, since no eyewitness can claim
omniscience.' 0 0 This is one of the most difficult, yet one of the most
essential functions of the lawyer in the adversary process. Its most
effective use requires great skill, which comes only with much experience in counselling people and a high aptitude for working with
people and understanding human nature. One must always use care,
however, to avoid coaching a party or witness to testify to facts
not within his personal knowledge' 0 ' and, as both a practical and an
ethical matter, should caution him to testify only to his perceptual
knowledge.
The writer has spoken of the above occurrence to some laymen
who immediately concluded that the old attorney was dishonest. The
writer, however, believes that the old lawyer had a high sense of both
honesty and loyalty and that these laymen were both inexperienced
and naive. The old attorney was suggesting only what every lawyer
should do when he accepts a case: gather the data, analyze it, and
prepare it so as to make the most favorable presentation for your
side; then look at it skeptically and advise your client as to the
possibilities, freely, honestly, and fearlessly. Even then a lawsuit is
a very unpredictable thing. As Professor Morgan has repeatedly
warned his students: "You'll sweat blood when your [key] witnesses
02

1
are on the stand."'

99. See also Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,

65 YALE L. J. 953, 954 at note 6 para. 3 (1956).

100. See also Almo v. Del Rosario, 98 F. 2d 328 (D.C. App. 1938) (holding
that plaintiff was not concluded by his own testimony). See also op. cit. note 98.
As a distinguished criminal lawyer once told a young trial court judge in
the presence of the writer, the facts all fit together to form a coherent pattern. When
a lawyer gets a case, the facts do not seem to form any clear pattern, and it is his
first task to assemble them and arrange them into a meaningful picture of what
has transpired. The lawyer must present to the trier of fact as good a picture as
can be presented at second hand, in the mind's eye, so to speak. To do this, he
must first re-live the facts himself. When he endeavors to do so, he may find
some facts of varying significance which do not fit into the pattern in a meaningful
manner. If this is the case, then he must continue to re-live the facts until they
all achieve meaningful significance in the harmonious arrangement of the scheme as
a whole. Only when the lawyer has thus mastered the facts is he in position to try
the case. Mastery of the law is important, but the facts are generally of controlling
importance.
101. AMtRICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS 0' PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon
39 (witnesses) ; Canon 22 (candor and fairness) (hereinafter cited as Canon .... );
and see text at note 104 post. For a good statement of the American position from
the practical standpoint, see Hawkins, The Trial of a Lawsuit in the United States,

46 A.B.A.J. 821, 826 (1960).
102. To his class in Evidence, Harvard Law School, Summer Term, 1946, the
writer being present.
On the elusive nature and fluidity of facts in the trial courts, see generally
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

(1930).
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The above-indicated practice is not only entirely proper, but it
helps the lawyer to play a more constructive role in the administration
of justice. If the privilege were abolished, the lawyer would be
seriously handicapped in performing this function, because he would
be required to narrate in detail, both on oral deposition and from the
witness stand, the conversations with his client. Opposing counsel
could create a false impression of the circumstances in a great many
instances; and, especially before juries, who are unlearned in such
matters,1 °2 a a lawyer skilled in histrionics could make a field day of it.
At the outset of the case, any lawyer would thus be forced to forego
the basic duty of rendering his highest devotion to his client's
cause - by not helping the client to figure out what happened on
the crucial occasion - or to take a chance, in rendering such devotion, that cross-examining counsel would be able to make it appear,
from the testimony of the lawyer being examined that he the latter
had fabricated the client's version of the facts. Here, the sense of
treachery element looms large.
There is, however, another aspect of the matter, namely, the
lawyer's duty to assist his client to have self-knowledge, so that the
latter may discover his problems and enlighten himself as to the
correct solution, to feel that he shares control with his lawyer and
that they are together in victory or defeat. This sense of rapport is
an important factor in the achievement of a feeling of individual
justice under our adversary-type of judicial system. The creation of
this sense of empathy and of unity will frequently represent counselling
at its best, and no inconsiderable part of counsel's role will consist in
counselling by indirection and cross-examination of the individual
client.'
Moreover, counsel is frequently faced with fluidity of the
facts and tenuousness of the relationship in the early stages of the
102a. This is ethically condemned but unfortunately is a matter of common
practice at the present time. The standards of the bar being what they are, it may

be expected to continue thus so long as the materialistic aspects of our culture are
held up as the incentives for endeavor, which means the indefinite future.
103. Mr. Simon sheds light on this practice and its possibilities in the following
passage: "It seems to this writer that the true subjects of the privilege are the
clients who are in the common position of not really 'knowing' the facts because
they do not understand the significance of what they think they saw or now remember. It is precisely because facts are subtle, elusive, and often unknowable that
counsel (in civil as well as in criminal cases) is expected to show them in their
best light, just as his adversary has the task of putting them in their worst. The
entire process of cross-examining one's own client in camera, of finding and presenting facts whose exact contours may never be known, is in our society a vital
aspect of legitimate partisanship. Perhaps there are some isolated areas of adjudication
where clients should be required to throw themselves upon the mercy and discretion of
an impartial inquisitor. Yet it hardly seems feasible to dispense with the adversary
system everywhere and at one blow. The result would not be less partisanship, but
a different kind, for the unscrupulous lawyer and the dishonest client would be able
to thread a path that the more conscientious could never follow." Simon, op. cit.
note 99, 954-55 n. 6.
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case. Here, the privilege is an important factor in helping the skilled
counsellor to provide the client with the sense of security and confidence which will enable the lawyer and the client to work out the
matter as a team in such a way that if individual justice cannot
be made to prevail it will at least have had a fair chance. It is
doubtful if the lawyer would have the necessary freedom and persuasiveness to handle the matter with the same skill and devotion,
particularly in the case of the client with intense personal problems with the accompanying state of emotional involvement - in the
absence of a substantial amount of freedom from the threat of compulsory disclosure of at least that information which would tend to
make the client look ridiculous, hurt his standing in the community,
or seriously threaten his economic interests. Yet, it is in this area
that the practice of law achieves its best results - by reason of the
services offered to the individual client during times of difficulty,
doubt, and emotional turmoil. If freedom from compulsory disclosure
were not assured, the lawyer simply could not assume the role of
counselor with the high degree of effectiveness that the achievement
of justice requires and which generally obtains in the practice of law
today.
Even in criminal cases there is a stronger argument for preserving the privilege than that the prosecutor will work up a good
case from his own resources, and a better reason than that the
defendant will lie to his counsel about any incriminating items however important these factors might be. There is the notion of a
fair trial, with adequate representation. There is serious doubt as to
whether this is possible unless there is freedom for the client and his
attorney to prepare the case without the knowledge and interference
of the state. In any event, it does not appear unreasonable that the
state, with all its vast resources, should be required to prove its
own case unaided by the almost subjective admissions of the individual
in this important area of "interest in personality," where personal
freedom may hang in the balance. As Professor McCormick has
pointed out in connection with the privilege against self-incrimination,
if the privilege were taken away, the lawyers in many instances would
be hard put to make a fight worthy of a fee.' °4 Thus a man's right
to his day in court would be seriously infringed.
Yet, the principle is bigger and more important than that. The
question is, do we want to put the highest safeguards around the
accused in criminal cases. There is a close connection between the
MCCORMICK
165. Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
Published104.
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privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege in
criminal cases.' 0 5 In fact, the latter is a logical extension of the former
in the area of the criminal law. There are too many miscarriages of
justice as it is without adding a restriction here.' 06 Is not this
privilege of having a confidential legal advisor just one of the precautions which we should take in our effort to safeguard the liberty
of the accused until he has been proven guilty? But above and beyond that, should we not allow the defendant, for reasons of his
personal sense of security and fair play, the right to a trusted legal
adviser whom he can use fully and freely and without fear that what
he discloses to such adviser may be used against him? The writer
believes that in choosing between competing values we should endeavor to preserve the privilege in its essential area, the face-to-face
situation. In the area of the criminal law, the privilege of confidential
communications between the client and his legal adviser should be
recognized as a human value in a class with the privilege against selfincrimination, the privilege against illegal search and seizure, and the
constitutional right to counsel.107 The protection of such a minimal
right to security of personality as was recognized by the Supreme
Court in denying the state courts the power to act upon evidence
obtained through the use of a stomach pump on the person of the
defendant without his consent is a case in point.10 8 Therefore, for
our purposes, Rochin v. California is another landmark of the law.
In the Rochin case,'
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
majority, first pointed out the requisites of due process 1 and then
went on to hold that it violates due process for a law enforcement
officer to extract evidence from the stomach of a suspected law violator.
Such methods "do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness of
private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically. This
is conduct that shocks the conscience ....

They are methods too close

to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation ...
Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to
brutalize the temper of a society." He then characterized the conduct
105. Id. § 75; Morgan, op. cit. note 28, 7, 27; Radin, op. cit. note 30, 493.
106. See BORCHARIi, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); FRANK AND FRANK,
NoT GuILTY (1957).
107. Coplon v. United States, 191 F. 2d 749 (D.C. App. 1951); cert. den. 342
U.S. 926 (1952).
108. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). It should be pointed out that as
of the present the due process clause is not held to guarantee the privilege against
self-incrimination from infringement by the states. See Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947), with strong dissent.

109. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
110. Discussed in text at note 276, post.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1
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as "offensive to human dignity."'' The Supreme Court of California
had denied a hearing after affirmance of a judgment of conviction by
the District Court of Appeal;"' two judges dissented. Other courts
have allowed conduct which would seem to be highly improper in
a humane society.'
Justice Frankfurter seems to have difficulty in
precisely articulating his standards, but is this not because these
standards, drawn out of an evolving social ethos, are not capable of
more precise statement at the present stage of legal development?
Nevertheless, it is being recognized that, at least in extreme cases,
the concept of human dignity is protected by the due process clause
of the United States Constitution. This is a definite advancement.
No previous Supreme Court decision had gone so far. The courts of
the British Commonwealth do not seem to have been disturbed by
the problem, though a similar question has arisen in Canada." 4 The
Rochin decision represents a new high water mark in protection of the
individual from unreasonable interference by the state in this area
of the law.

The writer submits that time has not vindicated Bentham's reply
to the "rules of the chase" argument in support of the privilege.
This argument has more force today than when it was first promulgated.
111. 342 U.S. 165, 172, 173-74 (1952). It should be pointed out that here
accuracy is not the vital factor. "To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers
call 'real evidence' from verbal evidence is to ignore the reason for excluding coerced
confessions. Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unrealiability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them
may be independently true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair
play and decency .... Frankfurter, J., in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173
(1952).
112. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 143, 225 P. 2d 1 (1950).
113. The examples are too numerous to require citation. A single confessiondue process case will suffice: Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also
Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third.Degree, 6 STAN. L. Riv. 411
(1954); MCCORMICK Ch. 12.
114. Rex v. Brezack, [1950] 2 D. L. R. 265 (Ont. C.A.). Here, two officers
were rather vigorous in pouncing upon the defendant and choking him in an
endeavor to prevent his swallowing narcotics. Subsequent search revealed no
narcotics on the defendant's person, but capsules were found in his car nearby. The
court was not disturbed by the conduct of the officers but found that the defendant
had committed an assault in biting the fingers of the officers when inserted into his
mouth in an attempt to recover the drug erroneously believed to be secreted there.
This case is compared with Rochin in a Comment on Rex v. McIntyre, [1952]
2 D. L. R. 713 (Alta. Sup. Ct.) (analysis of blood sample removed from person
of accused without warning held admissible), in 30 CAN. B. J. 747 (1952).
The effect of Rochin in California may be seen from the change of attitude
manifested in People v. Martinez, 130 Cal. App. 2d 54, 228 P. 2d 26 (1954), where
an officer placed a choke hold on the defendant, forcing him to spit out the
narcotic package. In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeal observed that
the question "is not how hard an officer may choke a suspect to obtain evidence
but whether he may choke him at all." 130 Cal. App. 2d 54, 56. The Court declared
that the Rochin case "should serve as a warning to all those who are tempted to
use brutal force for the extraction of evidence from the person of the accused."
Id. at 58.
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Yet, its statement by Mr. Denman (later Lord Chief Justice) is as
fine as any:
[It has been argued by a defender of this privilege that the guilty
are entitled to be protected to a certain extent; that supposed
policy has been thus phrased :] "Even in the few instances where
the accused has intrusted his defender with a full confession of
his crime, we hold it to be clear that he may still lawfully be
defended. The guilt of which he may be conscious, and which he
may have so disclosed, he has still a right to see distinctly
proved upon him by legal evidence. .

.

. Human beings are

never to be run down like beasts of prey, without respect to
the laws of the chase. If society must make a sacrifice of any one
of its members, let it proceed according to general principles,
upon known rules, and upon clear proof of necessity ... .
If this reasoning be not true, then "due process of law" means
nothing." 6 It is only a question of degree between adherence to
fair procedures - giving due regard to the substantive ends to be
accomplished, as well as the human sensibilities and values which
must be preserved in the course of achieving such accomplishment ,and the innovation of the patriot Robespierre, that the preferring
of a charge before the French Revolutionary Assembly should be the
equivalent of trial and conviction."'
While this illustration may be said to represent a difference in
degree so great as to amount to a difference in kind, it nevertheless
serves to illustrate the vital importance of procedural rights in a
world which is sensitive to the finer nuances of individual justice.
The long history of civil procedure bears witness to that, while the
light afforded by the history of procedural due process in our constitutional law is its best evidence. This does not mean that our
procedures must be exhalted into an art made esoteric with the
worship of technicalities. That condition has been the vice of two
former periods of our legal history. Rather, it means that fair
procedures must be developed and followed. Generally speaking, our
procedures must have such degree of flexibility as will facilitate the
accomplishment of their purposes, but within the limits of such reasoned flexibility they must be enforced or carried out. Our pro115. Loc. cit. note 83, ante. A statement by Mr. Denman (later L.C.J.), which is

answered by J. S. Mill, editor of Bentham's treatise, in "the best Benthamic spirit."
VIII WIcMOR § 2321 at 553 n. 2.
116. To hold otherwise is to allow the state itself to engage in acts of illegality,
to give legal recognition to lawlessness in the enforcement of our laws. This, for
example, is the view expressed by Holmes, J., dissenting, in Olmstead v. United

States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

117. See BELLOc, ROBEsPmnit 310, 339-56 (1908); for a short account, see

MORIxY, BIOCnAPHIAI, STUnlEs, Robespierre, 241-362 at 340-62 (1923).
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cedures are no less important than the substantive principles they
are designed to secure. Fair procedures, faithfully administered, are
the specific guarantee to the general populace of the substantive rule
of law. The attorney-client privilege in the criminal law is a part of
that essential minimum which is designated as procedural due process.
In the civil law, it is one of the devices by which the right to reasonable
privacy is secured in the area of personal relations (without the
necessity of a forced election which could have the effect in individual
instances of a denial of justice, the threat forever lurking in the
background). Would not important procedural safeguards be lacking
if the attorney-client privilege were abolished? In any event, Bentham's
argument to the effect that the guilty have no right to the protection
afforded by technical rules of procedure is patently unsound. To hold
otherwise is to decree judicial fiat on an ad hoc basis in the place of
equality before the law, with the ultimate goal of social justice.11 8
It has been said that the privilege is on the way out, and that
the path it may follow is that from rule to discretion." 9 The writer
submits that as a general proposition this should not be permitted to
occur. The path we take will depend upon a choice of competing
values, both of which have strong claim to recognition. Since the
claim of evidence is constant and all inclusive, while the claim of
privilege is only occasional and limited, a proper choice requires that

the latter should yield to the former except in those instances where
to yield would mean the surrender of the principle itself in its essence.
The claim of privilege not to disclose must be carefully balanced
against the claim of evidence to compel disclosure, in the light of
the particular kind of circumstances. On balance, the result will
be that in a narrow area, that of the face-to-face relationship, the
privilege should be preserved as an absolute rule of exclusion, with
certain rare exceptions to be hereinafter noted. In another area, there
should be a qualified immunity or rule of discretion,'120 and in all
118. The writer sometimes uses the term "social justice" to mean the equivalent
of a fair hearing and the term "individual justice" as that which an omniscient being
would decree after such a fair hearing, thus giving the individual his personal "just
due." The term "social justice" is used in that sense above.
119. McCORMICK 166. To the same effect is Oldham, Privileged Communications
in Military Law, MILITARY LAW R9V. July, 1959, 17, 66. He argues for the privilege and against making numerous exceptions to it but believes that a "sound
discretion" should be reposed in the law officer "to overrule privileges for considerations of justice." To the same effect is the Report of the Committee on
Improvements in the Law of Evidence, American Bar Association, Section of
Judicial Administration, pt. III, § 12 (March 15, 1938). De Parcq agrees with
McCormick that the privilege is on the way out. De Parcq, The Uniform Rules of
Evidence: A Plaintiff's View, 40 MINN. L. Rev. 301, 322 (1956).
120. Cf. MCCORMICK 208-10. The criticism of such classification as Professor
McCormick suggests is that it interferes with the Thayer principle of keeping the
rules of evidence simple and easy to apply. See THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EvIDENC4 529 (1898).
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other areas the privilege should not be recognized at all. The proper
scope and flexibility of the privilege will be considered in the remaining
pages of this paper.
III
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The writer submits that the attorney-client privilege can be
rested upon a sounder foundation than any that has heretofore been
suggested and that it must be placed on such firm foundation if it is
to survive as a generally unqualified immunity in the modern law of
evidence. Professor Wigmore articulated two specific and practical
elements of this foundation in his degrees of gray argument and
in his sense of treachery argument. Professor Radin sought a stronger
foundation for the privilege, but his rationale took a negative turn when
he went back to the Middle Ages and the Civil Law to find its
justification in a certain immaturity persisting in human personality
development down to the present time. 121 Professor Louisell, more
recently, has made a convincing case for justifying the personal
privileges on the basis of our cultural values. 22 Each of these justifications of the privilege contains an element of the truth. The lastnamed one represents a positive and more comprehensive approach to the
problem and thus seems to the writer to be nearer to the solution of
the problem (the comprehensive basis).
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the age of reason
and enlightenment. Believing that "reason" was the key which could
unlock the universe, men undertook to remake society on rational
principles. Institutions which had come down from the past were
made to stand the test of reason or be cast aside. But much that had
been handed down from prior ages was of value, though it might not
be justified by abstract reason readily perceived, and the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries did not have many of the valuable tools
which the modern social sciences are developing for measuring social
institutions and how they function. In the Age of Reason, men
worked on the basis of pure reason and the imaginary projection of
hypothetical situations into the future. The result, in the case of the
attorney-client privilege, was an abstract defense, based on the ideal
121. Op. cit. note 85, esp. at 492-93; quoted in text herein at note 93.
122. See Louisell, op. cit. note 91 (hereinafter cited as Louisell) ; Louisell,
The Psychologist in Today's World, 41 MINN. L. R~v. 731 (1957) (hereinafter cited
as Psychologist).
Dean Griswold has made a strong plea: for the preservation of the privilege
against self-incrimination as a part of the civilized values of our culture. GRISWOLD,
THE FIFTir AMENDMJNT TODAY (1955).
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of loyalty or the felt need of encouraging full disclosure of the client
to his legal counsellor; or a rationalistic attack, such as Bentham
made, without giving sufficient consideration to the realities of everyday life. Thus it came about, by reason of the milieu in which the
great thinkers of the day lived and worked, that their attacks and
defenses of the privilege were a priori and little more. Today, we are
better informed. We know that while reason is a valuable tool, it
is not the only one. 2 ' We also know that the product of reason must
be constantly re-evaluated in the light of experience, new learning,
methods, and values. In fact, that is the method of judicial empiricism,
in the finest tradition of the common law, the search for the workable
124
legal precept, the principle which is fruitful of the good result.
Finally, we can bring to our aid in evaluating the privilege much
practical experience of the last three centuries from the court records,
the personal recollections (often unrecorded) of bench and bar, and the
studies in the various fields of the social sciences. While our analytic
synthesis must be largely rationalistic, it will be made in the context
of this growing yet time-proven method.
Dean Wigmore proceeded mainly after the manner of the rationalists but also urged certain practical considerations. He adopted
the view that the public policy favoring full disclosure by
the client to his counselor of all facts within his knowledge is very
important. In support of this viewpoint, he put forth the treachery
argument and the degrees of gray theory of the value of the case. He
argued that recognition of the privilege actually discouraged litigation.124a This has already been discussed briefly, and Professor
Radin's related views have also been considered.' 2 5 These facets of
the foundation of the privilege are important, but they are not the
rock foundation upon which the privilege must be anchored as sound
legal principle. The privilege is based upon ethical values which are
more or less intuitively understood by the legal profession generally.
There are circumstances which follow as a natural effect of the
privilege and which tend to support these ethical values. These circumstances tend to have important bearings on a large part of our
litigation process. Hence, the privilege, though having its origin and
its scope in abstract theoretical considerations, has highly practical
123. For example, see Cardozo's four methods of the judicial process, namely:
CARDOZO, THt NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESs 30-31 (1921).
124. See Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (3 pts.), 36 HARV. L. Rev. 641,
802, 940 at 953 et passim (1923).
124a. He pointed out that in criminal cases the privilege is necessary to the
defendant's day in court and that the loss of evidence therefrom is comparatively
small in modern times, since the parties can now testify.
125. See text at note 85 et seq.

logic, history (evolution), custom, and sociology.
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effects or results. Therefore, at this point, the writer will briefly

consider the privilege from the practical standpoint of everyday life in
the law.
The reluctant litigant has no choice other than to seek the aid
of an attorney when his interests are seriously threatened in areas
where legal action or defense is the most effective remedy. Of course,
there will always be reluctant suitors, and this will be true whether or
not there is a privilege. It cannot be told of course whether the parties
would be any more reluctant if the privilege were lost. Probably
not in today's sophisticated world, since a party can consult a lawyer
without giving the complete account, and this is well understood by
the rank and file of the general public, not to mention the more elite.
Nevertheless, there will always be a certain amount of hesitancy by the
timid and the hunted in consulting counsel, and we cannot be sure
as to just how much the existence of the privilege tends to negative
such natural hesitancy of people in these categories. If this alone
were the problem, then we might well hesitate to insist upon the
retention of the privilege, because of an inability to reason from
the premises to the conclusion (of its proven value). Its degree of
value here will always tend to remain largely in the area of speculation. However, when we reach the area of actual consultation of
the lawyer by the client, we are on more solid ground in support of
the privilege. Even here, however, it is soon apparent that the
client in general has no other choice than to make full disclosure to
his lawyer, for his own enlightened self-interest. Nevertheless, if he
does not make full disclosure to his lawyer there is nothing which
can be done about it - except that the experienced counselor can
exercise patience and use his persuasive powers. In fact, it is often

the case today that the client will fail to fully disclose the facts of
his case to his counsel even though he is fully protected from compulsory disclosure of either himself or his lawyer through the judicial
process, and is well aware of this protection.
In practice, this is what may actually happen: before he goes to

a lawyer, the client makes a judgment as to how much he will tell
and how he will relate it. His conclusion may be firm or it may be
flexible. He may revise it from time to time. The lawyer himself
may not clearly conceive the position which he should take at the
beginning of a new professional relationship, though it can be safely
said that in general he desires to have the facts as soon as he can
obtain them. In a particular case, however, he may endeavor to obtain
full disclosure either at once or gradually, as he wins the client's
confidence and establishes a good relationship. On the other hand,
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the lawyer may not want to know all the facts. He may prefer to
guess and to deal with what the client tells him, feeling that he thus
has a wider range of choice in preparing and choosing his course of
action, and this is particularly true in criminal cases, where the
necessity for a trial may be inevitable and the liberty of the client may
hang in the balance. 2 6 Yet, if there were no privilege, the tendency
of defendants to make full disclosure in the vast majority of the cases
would undoubtedly be diminished in substantial degree, and the
lawyer would probably make less effort to learn everything about
the matter. In fact, it might well become the lawyer's ethical duty
to warn the client that anything the client might say could be used
against him.
The relationship of attorney and client is close and personal. For
it to be most effective, there should be complete trust and confidence.
A high degree of trust and confidence is difficult for the profession
to achieve under present favorable circumstances. It would be more
difficult without the rules of privilege. The promotion of justice
is a most important value in any rationally oriented society. In our
system of administering justice, the attorney plays a pivotal role.
'2 7
"[T]he lawyer's office is the very ante room of the courthouse.'
The lawyer himself is the main actor on the little stage of the courtroom trial. It is necessarily this way in an adversary system of
litigation. Yet in all he does, the lawyer acts for his client, and he
owes the highest duty of devotion to the client's cause. It is essential
that this relationship of attorney and client should be protected by

the cloak of secrecy, unless the client should choose to waive the
protection. But it is equally important for evidentiary purposes that
this protection should extend only to the personal essence of that
relationship. 12 This basis for limitation of the privilege must always
be kept in mind. It is when the courts have failed to do just this
that they have extended the privilege beyond the area of its natural

confines, that is, the area where the privilege should inhere, if we are
to recognize a privilege.
If the option of secrecy could not be reserved to the client,
the following undesirable results would tend to occur in a great many
126. The writer once saw a motion picture in which this was the case. A
skillful criminal defense lawyer represented a woman charged with murder. He
suspected that she was guilty and had no plausible defense. He did not press her
to obtain the true facts. Had he done so, his hands would have been securely tied,
but on the basis of her rather implausible story, he at least presented a defense
to the jury. Discussion with members of the criminal bar indicates that they have
no one generally accepted method of handling such potentially dangerous situations.
127. MCCORMICK 222.
128. E.g., see VIII WIGMORV § 2306 (Communications distinguished from Acts:
Client's Conduct, Appearance, Abode, etc.) ; §§ 2307-20.
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cases, without any offsetting advantage on the side of evidence.
Let us assume a common type of situation: The client C consults
attorney A and is advised that C does not have a good cause of
action. C then consults attorney B but changes the facts which he
relates to B sufficiently to overcome the defects in his case that
A has pointed out in the prior conference. Since A (not knowing what
C has told B) would have an ethical duty not to disclose that he
had been previously consulted, particularly if requested not to do so,
the information contained in C's communication to A might well
never come to the knowledge of the opponent."2 9 Hence, A would
never be subpoenaed to give his deposition or to take the witness
stand. But if this information should come to light and A were
required to give his testimony, C could explain that his subsequent
reflection or investigation, as the case might be, had indicated the
facts to be different from those he had originally believed. C might
even deny that he had told A that the facts were thus and so (that
is, different from what he told B), and who could say that he might
not be making the statement with an honest belief in its truth?'
All lawyers who have had experience with clients know that these
instances do frequently occur, because they happen in cases where
there is not the slightest motive to falsify or where integrity is
unimpeachable or both. 8 ' Under these circumstances, harm would
have been done to the attorney-client relationship, the court's time
would have been consumed, and yet the end result would probably
not be substantially different from the one at the present time (when
the privilege is recognized). In fact, if it should appear that the
client was actually using the series of consultations as a basis for
fabricating a claim or cause of action, there would be adequate
grounds for either the first or the second attorney to come forward
and disclose what he might know about the matter, under the tort
or crime exception to the privilege. 1 32 This is a partial answer to
129. But see Radin, op. cit. note 30, 492, 494-97; Canon 37; A.B.A.,
OF

COMMITTEE

ON

PROFESSIONAL, E'rHICS AND

Canon 37 (1957 ed.)

GRIEVANCES,

(hereinafter cited as Opinion .... ).

OPINIONS

Opinions interpreting
The attorney's duty of

fidelity to his client is not co-extensive with the privilege but extends over a wider

area.
130. More rarely, though occasionally, it turns out that the client's version of
what he formerly said to counsel is the more accurate one. This may happen more
frequently than astute counsel would like to believe. Yet in most instances the
trier of fact would probably tend to believe the lawyer, as a more impartial
witness than the client. This would mean that when the client was right and the
original lawyer was in error as to what had been said, the cause of justice would
not be served by having the lawyer's testimony available.
131. See MCCORMICK 202. Mere variance does not show fraud so as to permit
disclosure under this exception.
132. Discussed in text at note 150 et seq.
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Professor Radin's argument against Dean Wigmore's statement of
the practical difficulties which would arise if the privilege were
abolished.'1 3 Here, not only is the sense of treachery element lurking
in the background, but the degrees of gray argument rushes to the
forefront. The example given, which is a classical one, is an oversimplification of the problem, as it assumes a clearcut case on the
facts, which we cannot have as a general instance, and yet the law
in this area must be designed to meet the general average. Moreover,
when the case is less clear, the argument for the privilege is even
stronger.
Furthermore, assuming that the privilege were abolished, we
cannot say that evidence would inevitably profit. That it would
profit might be true in the case of the unwary, but are they not the
ones least likely to falsify in any event? Are they not the ones
about whom we should show some concern as a class to whom protection ought to be accorded?

For the litigation-wise, there would

be ways to avoid the disclosure of the facts of their case to counsel
until they were in a position to understand something of the legal
significance of such facts. For example, a way in which disclosure

might be avoided (if the privilege did not exist) would be for the
client to put to the attorney a hypothetical case. It is questionable
if the attorney would be required to disclose the hypothetical case
and the advice based thereon except under the most unusual circumstances.13 There are many variations of the possibilities here
for obtaining sound legal advice without substantial risk of discovery of the actual facts known to the communicant or his purpose
in having a conference with the lawyer."3 5 Thus, it is not uncommon
for clients to call attorneys on the telephone, either anonymously or
giving their names. The attorney might give the advice requested
without inquiry; or if he learned the name of the party making the
inquiry, he might immediately dismiss the matter from his mind and
never recall it again. If he did recall it, he might not remember the
name of the party calling or the details of the conversation or both.
This is not at all unusual when the lawyer's mind is only mo133. Radin, op. cit. note 30 at 492. And see text at note 91 ante.
On this point, see generally Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client
Privilege IV, text at notes 58-59 et seq. (tentative draft of unpublished paper by

the writer, to which reference is also made in note 343 post).
134. Because there is nothing to show that the case is based on circumstances
other than conjecture. (The writer has had such
practice.) In fact, it would probably be unethical for
conversation, whatever he might suspect about the
readily perceived when the attorney's ethical duties

cases put to him in private
the lawyer to disclose such a
client's motives (as will be
of confidentiality and loyalty

are considered).
135. See note 129 ante.
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mentarily diverted from the task at hand to one on the periphery of
his consciousness. If the lawyer were later questioned about such, a
situation, he would certainly have to give the consultant the benefit of
any doubt on the point of memory. Moreover, such a device (as the
casual telephone consultation) could lend itself to abuse as a standard
of subterfuge by the weak and the unethical,'
thus tending to
discriminate against the lawyer with high ethical standards and to
lower the moral tone of the profession generally. In addition to the
casual or anonymous telephone consultation, wary and crafty individuals bent on litigation under any circumstances might well
consult counsel initially through intermediaries, with the same or
even greater effectiveness in maintaining the desired secrecy.'" 7
The aforesaid examples, however, assume a crystallized case,
that is, one in which the client knows all of the important facts and
their interrelationship and legal significance. Yet, this is generally
not true when the client first seeks an attorney. As the late Judge
Frank has taught the theorists, and as the practicing lawyers have
known all the time, facts are slippery things,"' and they are crystallized at the beginning of a lawsuit only when there is some peg, some
tether restricting the ambit of imagination around which a fertile
mind can range.'
Thus, Harry Sabboth Bodin, the famous New
York trial lawyer, describes a case in which an astute cross-examiner
won a victory by pinning down an opposing party on the witness
stand during the trial as to a certain fact which had only hidden
significance. 4 0 The technique is familiar trial strategy, though trial
counsel generally do it almost instinctively when confronted with the
situation. In this case, the witness (plaintiff) did not know the
significance of a certain fact X. 4 When asked about it on cross136. It would give the unethical attorney a potent weapon for compelling an
honest party who had consulted him not to thereafter retain a different lawyer.

Yet, neither dishonest lawyer nor client could be compelled to disclose what had
transpired unless it was to their interest to do so, and then they would be able to
restate the circumstances to suit the needs of their case as they conceived such
needs. (This is a facet of the problem of "compelling perjury.")
137. This is a further answer to Professor Radin's argument against Dean
Wigmore's statement of the practical difficulties which would follow if the privilege
were abolished. The general area of attorney-client relations would be disturbed,
the court's time would be consumed, and little if anything more would be accomplished toward the discovery of objective truth than at the present time. Both
here and in the last illustration considered, there would of course be a big
temptation on the part of both the lawyer and the client to commit perjury.
138. See FRANK, LAW AND THI MODERN MIND, esp. first few pages (1930).
139. The written document is the most common example of such a tether. A
good photograph is another example.
140. BODIN, PRINCIPLES OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 66-70 (P.L. I. 1953 ed.).
See also CORNELIUS, TRIAL TAC'rICS Ch. IV, Preparationof a Case for Trial, 33
et seq. (1932).
141. The fact X was that a certain conversation took place on a certain date.
This was not important in itself, but the defendant could prove that he had been
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examination, he testified positively to its existence in a certain manner
and form, and as a result he lost the case. If he had been less positive
on this point, he would probably have come away the victor. Had
he known of the significance of the matter, he might have given a
qualified answer which could have been changed later, thus making
insignificant the particular issue on which the case was actually decided. When the hidden significance of the fact X (the date on which
a conversation had taken place) became apparent, the party could
have said that he was obviously mistaken. The defendant would not
have been able to disprove the substance of the plaintiff's claim, since
the particular evidence was more available to the plaintiff. A sympathetic jury might well have accepted a plausible explanation, even an
error in memory, because such mistakes are a part of the common
experience of mankind in circumstances where there is no motive to
falsify. Furthermore, while it is probable in the particular case that
the plaintiff's claim was fabricated, it is by no means certain to the
writer that this was the situation.' 42 And whether or not the particular
conversation did actually take place on some other date, there are
many cases of similar tenor in which witnesses are obviously mistaken
about important facts and yet are truthful in the substance of their testimony. This is particularly true in the case of items such as dates,
time, quantity, figures, and other numerical or quantitative items, and
descriptions of people. The Chinese have a proverb that one picture
is worth a thousand words; and, an experienced trial lawyer-author
(quoting from another source) recognized the difficulties inherent in
the problem when he made the following statement: "I would sooner
trust the smallest slip of paper for truth than the strongest and most
retentive memory ever bestowed on man.' 42a It is well recognized by
those who work with factual details that the memory of man is an
inaccurate instrument when it comes to the recollection of details of
past events, especially when unverified by other sensory data. It is
equally well recognized that the accuracy of man's initial sensory
impressions depends upon numerous imponderables, both subjective
and objective, such as his apperception, his immediate physical sensitivity, the surrounding conditions of the natural world, and his
relationship to those conditions. All of these items make every case
and every witness unique - aside from the fact that there are many
out of town on the date on which plaintiff had positively asserted that the conversation took place.
142, It is believed that this example indicates that if there were no privilege,
the lawyer's position would be rendered more difficult by reason of the slippery
nature of the facts alone.

14 2 a.

CORNELIUS, TRIAL TACtiCs

62 (1932).
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occurrences in which the detailed circumstances cannot be accounted
for by the best trained minds, working with the developed techniques
of this scientific age.
These factors should be carefully considered in connection with
any proposal to abolish the privilege. It dramatically points up the
question: When considered in general, would the information gained
from the compulsory disclosure by the client and the lawyer of the
communications of the former to the latter be of substantial value to
the opponent and ultimately to the trier of fact? The answer to this
question becomes even more difficult when weighed against the increased cost of preparation and consumption of time which would
result from the opening up of a whole new area for pretrial discovery
and trial presentation.
As the writer has shown above, there are many situations in
which the client could, if warned in advance, qualify or change his
answer (whether honestly or otherwise), without raising an ethical
problem for counsel. In fact, in the particular instance related above,
it appears to the writer that plaintiff's counsel was probably not adequately prepared for the trial, and certainly he did not properly
prepare his client for standing up under cross-examination. The
technique for avoiding such pitfalls is well known to good trial counsel
and the witnesses are routinely prepared to meet the various kinds of
problems with which they may be confronted on the stand. Here, the
witness should not have been merely warned, but should also have
been indoctrinated against testifying too positively in doubtful areas
and given illustrations of how such positiveness of assertion might
result in harm to the client's cause. Counsel and the client should
also have "re-lived" the case together until they understood all of
its ramifications. By then, the lawyer should have known whether
or not his client's claim was genuine. Of course, this was probably
one of those cases where the matter of costs to the parties was important, and the defendant's honor was worth more to him, a
prominent man of business, than the plaintiff's additional salary was
worth to him, a working man. Such circumstances incidentally make
out a strong case for pretrial discovery, since today the particular
situation would be thoroughly investigated in advance of trial and
the element of surprise thereby eliminated, at least when one is
represented by diligent counsel. The defendant's verified evidence
as to his being in Florida on the date when the plaintiff testified that
they had conferred in New York points up another important factor:
it is only when there is evidence available which will settle the
matter beyond dispute that the facts can be pinned down prior to
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the taking of written statements and depositions, or the actual trial
itself; and, even then, there are exceptions. There are renowned
instances of doubtful factual circumstances in cases that have worried
the most intimate and indefatiguable counsel of the parties for the
remainder of such counsels' lives. There is no such thing as an
"open and shut" lawsuit. A fortiori, there is no such thing as an
established set of facts - not even from the client's own mouth - in
advance of the trial and the decision itself.14 b If this were not the
case, lawyers would not "sweat blood" while their key witnesses are
on the stand. Furthermore, a different version of the facts may appear
on a retrial of the case, and the versions at times are so dissimilar
as to bear little or no resemblance. Yet, this again is only a partial
answer to Professor Radin's reply to Dean Wigmore.143
The point here is that, assuming Professor Radin's chosen example, which we have shown would not be true to circumstances in
many instances, nevertheless, it cannot be convincingly argued that
if the privilege did not exist the actual results in accuracy of fact
presentation would be substantially better than at the present time.
The privilege affords a party and his counsel the opportunity to work
the case up before presenting the client's version of the case for the
first time. Yet, on the other side of the ledger, there would be substantial harm to the relationship of the party and his lawyer and to clients
and lawyers in general, and consumption of much valuable time of the
parties and the courts in working out the rules of the game and then in
continually enforcing them. Of course, it cannot be denied that there are
many cases in which a party would obtain some valuable piece of evidence that might not otherwise be had through diligent investigation
and the use of pretrial discovery methods. Still, it does not presently appear that these instances would occur often in proportion to the vast
amount of litigation which is in the courts. Furthermore, in general, the
time and expense incurred thereby would probably not make the
results worth the effort. Yet once the privilege should be abolished,
conscientious counsel would feel that his duty to the client would
require that he exhaust his pretrial remedies in this area, so as to
avoid the possibility of overlooking some avenue of discovery of
142b. Even then, it is the decision which determines what the facts were, and
this determination may be a far cry from reality. What lawyer has not laughed at
the "de jure" determination of the facts? The decisions of both courts and juries
are at best "impressionistic" - no less than the observations of the witnesses
themselves. They aim at a "rough and ready" justice by approximation, often
ignoring specific "hard" facts in order to reach what appears to be "just about
right" or their idea of substantial justice in the particular case. Yet, the result is
often more in accordance with the kind of solution which we would like to see
than that which strict adherence to technical facts and rules of law would permit.
143. See text at notes 91-92.
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information that might lead to his gaining an advantage over the
opponent.
All of these complex factors merely go to show that when a
case is still in its subjective stage, before the facts have become
crystallized and fitted into the finished jig-saw puzzle, so to speak,
it cannot be said with confidence what the decision ought to be. Hard
facts are crystallized facts, presented by the parties after careful
deliberation (not lightly) and with knowledge of the consequences.
They are the positions on which the parties stake their cases, so to
speak. It is only when the parties have had this opportunity for
formal presentation of their cases that we are in a position to say that
the parties ought to be held bound by what they have said, though we,
as advocates, may wish to test such a deliberate statement of the
case against as much of the composite picture as can be obtained.
The privilege is qualified by another principle of law which is
basically sound but which has sometimes been applied in such a manner
as to work an injustice. This is the principle of waiver1 44 and the
rules based thereon. The principle of waiver is on solid ground (1)
when the client makes a voluntary decision not to claim the privilege;
and (2) when he takes a position that would give him an unjust
benefit were the waiver doctrine not applied - for example, when
on direct examination the client testifies to what he told his attorney
and then objects to having the attorney testify as to what he (the
client) said. But the courts have shown some confusion in applying the
rules pertaining to waiver of privilege, and the unwary counsel may
be trapped, to the detriment of his client. This is particularly true
when inquiry is made of a party on cross-examination as to what
he has told his attorney. There is a split of authority as to whether
the party will be found to have waived the privilege when he answers without objection. 145 In some jurisdictions the waiver doctrine
has been carried to such an extreme that the client by merely taking
the stand and testifying to the facts within his knowledge has been
held to have waived the privilege.' 46 This puts counsel to a rather
unhappy choice as to whether to forego his client's testimony or to
suffer the loss of the privilege. In addition, there are problems revolving around the lurking possibility of an adverse inference from the
144. VIII WIGMOR4 §§ 2327-29;
contained in 51 A.L.R. 2d 521 (1957).

MCCORMICK

§ 97. A valuable note on waiver is

145. Cases cited in id. at 544; and see MCCORMICK 197.

146. Ibid. and cases cited in n. 4 there. The reasoning of these cases is based on
an erroneous analogy to the case of the criminal defendant who waives the privilege
against self-incrimination by taking the stand and testifying for himself.
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claim of privilege, particularly during the jury trial. 4 ' "Waiver" has
been well defined as the intentional relinquishment of a known right,
with full knowledge of its existence, including all the facts. 4 ' When
waiver is the result of ignorance of technical rules, it basically works
against the policy of the privilege and cannot be justified.'4 9
In addition to the principle of waiver, the crime or tort exception is an equally sound qualification of the privilege. 5 A principle
which so far separated law from ethics as to hold that a relationship
conceived in wrongdoing was entitled to protection could not justify
itself in a society guided by moral principles. Whether the exception
should go so far as to apply to conversations of a client with his
attorney for legitimate purposes but perhaps used for unlawful purposes, raises an interesting but difficult question of interpretation.
This was one facet of the problem presented by the case of In re
Selser.'" Here, the majority held that the privilege does not apply,
but this decision was probably reached by viewing the activities of
the client as a state of continuous participation in the affairs of a
criminal syndicate. The dissenters viewed the particular challenged
situation more in isolation and relied upon the good faith of the
attorney in asserting the claim of privilege. Another difficult question
arises when the purpose of the client is wrongful but does not
involve moral turpitude.' 52 On this point, there is some disagreement.
In Clark v. State, 53 the defendant, having committed murder,
consulted his counsel by telephone and was advised to dispose of the
murder weapon. The court held that an eavesdropping telephone
operator could testify to the conversation, as it came within the
crime or fraud exception and the eavesdropping exception to the rule
147. See People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 435, 126 N.E. 2d 559, 51 A.L.R. 2d 515
(1957); MCCORMICK § 80.
148. See definition of "waiver" in WORDS AND PHRASES (Perm. ed. 1940).
149. For further discussion of the subject of waiver, see generally an article by
the writer, Principles of Waiver - Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 CAL. B. J. 262

(1960).

150. VIII WIGMORS §§ 2327-29; McCORMICK § 99; Note, 125 A.L.R. 508
(1940).
151. 15 N.J. 393, 105 A. 2d 395 (1954) ; noted in 103 U. PA. L. Riv. 276

(1954).

152. See VIII WIGMOR4 § 2298 at 547; McCORMIcK 202.
153. 261 S.W. 2d 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953) ; cert. den. 346 U.S. 855 (1953)

noted in 32

TEXAS

L. Rev. 615 (1954). There are other difficulties apparent in the

case. The court allowed the introduction of evidence obtained by eavesdropping of
a special kind that could not readily be detected and that was in violation of the

rules of the telephone company. Since the court talked about the tort or crime
exception, the possible violation of the constitutional right to counsel was
considered. There is also the legal and ethical question as to how far a lawyer
ethically go in advising a client in a criminal case how best to protect himself.
Quick, Privilege under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 26 U. CINc. L. Rzv.

541-42 (1957).
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of privilege.,'
As to the former, the difficulty revolves around the
problem of proof.' 55 The Texas court had no difficulty, however,
because it applied the eavesdropping exception. This rule is a constant threat to the application of the personal privileges in their most
vital areas. Where this exception is not adhered to, the state would
be without the requisite proof of color of wrongdoing, unless the
lawyer should choose to come forward and voluntarily disclose what
has transpired. Counsel would hardly do that in a case like the Clark
case, where he was a party to the conspiracy to obstruct justice, presumably carried out by the client, since the murder weapon was not
found.
The crime or tort exception plays a valuable role in the law of
attorney-client privilege. In addition to keeping the law aligned on
the side of morality in the theoretical sense, it frees the hand of
counsel to aid the law in bringing to justice an unscrupulous person
who would use the law for nefarious ends. When counsel had become a party to such schemes, the rule enables the law to act against
both client and lawyer. They can no longer use the privilege as a
shield. Their confidences are without the pale of the law." 6
Yet this exception is no palladium for the good conduct of the
attorney and his client. It cannot prevent the client with an unlawful
purpose from seeking the advice or help of counsel. It cannot prevent
counsel from giving advice and actively participating in the nefarious
schemes of his clients, if counsel so chooses. Such conduct is rather
common for lawyers of the shyster class, and such lawyers even go
to the extent of faking records, while there are more numerous cases
in which they take great precautions both to protect and to eloign
confidential records. Nor has this practice always been confined among
the more shady-dealing part of the bar. In The Great Mouthpiece,
the author relates how defense counsel "bugged" the office of the
district attorney of Westchester County, New York, in an important
case, and how the late William J. Fallon, as assistant district attorney,
154. The general rule is discussed in VIII WIGMORE § 2326 (favoring);
§ 79 (critical). Cf. VIII WirMORg § 2339; MCCORMICK § 86 (marital
communications). The UNIrORM RULES op EvIDENcz, Rule 26 (1) (c) (ii) (1954),
MCCORMICK

do not recognize this rule (hereinafter cited as UNIFORM RULEs, R.
155. Cf. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) ("To drive the privilege
away, there must be prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in fact."

Cardozo, J., in case involving fraud of a juror, but the principle is followed in
cases involving the tort or crime exception) ; United States v. Bob, 106 F. 2d
37, 125 A.L.R. 502 (2d Cir. 1939).

156. For further discussion of the crime or tort exception, see Symposium, The

Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics and
Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. Rgv. 235 (1961) ; Gardner, The Crime or
Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A.J. 708 (1961).
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in turn seized the files of defense counsel. 5 7 Irving Stone, in his
superb biography of Clarence Darrow, tells how both Darrow and the
district attorney surreptitiously examined the files of each other in
the celebrated case of the McNamara brothers, who bombed the
Los Angeles Times Building back in the first decade of the present
century.'5 In that case, the really important evidence was kept in
the minds or on the persons of counsel and their trusted confidential
agents. The example par excellence, however, did involve less illustrious
counsel. This was the adoption of a general practice by that classic
law firm of Howe and Hummel, attorneys for the New York underworld of the end of the last century, of maintaining a minimum of
records of their clients' legal affairs, because the records might later
prove embarrassing. 59 These lawyers were well aware of the crime
or tort exception to the privilege. In the notorious Dodge-Morse case,
which ranged over the United States for more than a decade, finally
resulting in the disbarment and criminal conviction of Abraham H.
Hummel, the records could not be produced in court on subpoena
duces tecum, simply because there were none. No records had been
kept!
It is of course readily apparent that the privilege serves as a
cloak for many confidential relationships which rightfully fall within
the tort or crime exception to the privilege. In such instances, the
lawyer is able to take advantage of the appearance of things, and the
courts are reluctant to force disclosure, since once the secret has
been told, the damage is done, even though the disclosure should
show that the claim of privilege was justifiable. This, on first
appearance, is a telling argument against the retention of the privilege. Yet, aside from the value of the privilege in other areas, its
abolition would not be an unmixed blessing even here. The examples
discussed in the last few pages would tend to demonstrate this point,
for the unethical attorney is not deterred by the loss of privilege,
while the ethical attorney will endeavor to maintain high standards
of conduct whether the privilege is preserved or abolished.
The argument here is not that because attorneys might be dishonest we should make it easier for them to be that way (by retaining
the privilege). Rather, it is that the policy of full disclosure would put
a premium on dishonesty, thus lowering the standards of the profession and making it more difficult to maintain an honorable and
157. FOWLER, THE GREAT MOUTHPIECE Ch. IX, discussing the Osborne Case,

99-130 (1931).
158. STONE, FOR

T~HE DEfeNSr 273 et seq. (1941).
159. ROBERE, HowE & HUMMELL (1947). The Dodge-Morse Case is discussed

at 154 et seq.
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upright bar. The dishonest attorney and client will not be appreciably hurt by a rule of compulsory disclosure, but the honest ones,
in addition to being subjected to the psychological notions of treachery,
would often have their hands tied far more securely than at the
present time. Moreover, such a policy would cause uncertain fears
on the part of the public and would aggravate a tendency now present
on the part of some people to seek dishonest lawyers to represent
them when their cases are good ones. The circumstances as a whole
could cause some good men to shun the law as a profession. These
factors would generate pressures in some lawyers to stoop to unethical
practices which they might otherwise have the moral courage to refrain from doing. In the present state of our society, such circumstances certainly would not create a healthy outlook on the part of
either client or counsel but would tend to bring out individual weaknesses and flaws of character.
It is frequently true at the present time that many people feel
that even though one might have a just cause, nevertheless, he should
seek a shyster lawyer, since such a lawyer will have more leeway to
fight with whatever weapons the, opponent might select, thereby
making victory more certain for the cause of the client. Such a lawyer,
they will argue, can bolster up the case, if necessary, to vindicate the
cause of justice, by tactics which the punctiliously honest lawyer must
shun. This feeling about lawyers is not unusual on the part of clients
and litigants. The writer has seen it manifested both in his private
law practice and in everyday life. It is not uncommonly found in
literature. The detective fiction of Erle Stanley Gardner, while frequently a far cry from legal reality, deals in questionable and unethical
tactics by defense counsel -

the famous Perry Mason -

in the inter-

est of good causes for honorable people. If the client knew that he
would be forced to disclose in court what had transpired between
him and his lawyer and that the latter would be required to submit
to cross-examination thereon, the client might well feel that he was
being put at a decided disadvantage, in that his opponent, only
occasionally dishonest (but far more frequently believed to be dishonest), would gain an advantage not only by such personal dishonesty but also by his counsel's willingness to take the stand and
affirm the most favorable story, whatever it might be.' 6 ° A weak
character might lie as a result of this feeling, rationalizing that it
was necessary in his own enlightened self-interest. A stronger character, while resisting such temptation, might nevertheless feel, par160. This will be allowed for the purpose of rehabilitating a witness in certain

situations. IV WIGMOR

§§ 1126, 1129; McCoRMIcK 108-09.
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ticularly if he should loss his case, that he and all other honest litigants
were being imposed upon by the practice of such a system. Such a
condition would have an adverse effect on the general attitude of
the public toward the courts as the dispensers of justice. Yet, it is
probably as important for the people to feel that they are obtaining
justice as it is that they actually should obtain it. This feeling that
substantial justice is generally being achieved might be seriously
impaired by the abolition of the privilege. The writer fears that the
resultant general atmosphere would be conducive to the rationalization of a lower level of conduct on the part of both the bar and the
litigants.
There is another side to this argument: As has been pointed
out, most clients are neither black nor white in their moral conduct,
and their claims are neither entirely valid nor invalid. Many a good
client has lost a good case through being persuaded by his unethical
lawyer to bolster it up with perjured testimony of a non-existent
eye-witness, a forged document, or some other fabricated measure.
Perhaps more common, however, is the mere slanting of the facts in
presentation beyond the favorable presentation which constitutes good
advocacy. But whether the case is good, bad, or somewhere in between, a client who hires an honest lawyer may be saved from dishonest practices. This tends to preserve high standards of justice and
to maintain that respect for the law which must be one of the foundations of civilized government. In other words, the honest lawyer can
do as much to maintain honesty in the courts and thereby to further
the administration of justice as the dishonest lawyer can do to defeat
the fair administration of justice.
As an example in point, consider the case of "Sam the Lookout,"
who was being pressured by his captain and shipmates to give
dishonest testimony in the interest of their cause, which they conIn the absence of a privileged relationship,
sidered a just one.'
counsel would hardly have been able to learn the true facts of that
case, and it might have been a case in which he would not even have
wished to know them. In fact a lawyer with a reputation for disregarding the facts might have been chosen. Yet, it was a case in which
an honest lawyer could bring greater pressure to bear to make the parties tell the truth, perhaps to settle the controversy with good feelings on
the part of all concerned. It should also be recognized that the lawyers
themselves, as individuals, are neither wholly honorable nor entirely
dishonorable, but like their clients they range through all gradations
161. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. Riv. 3, 6 (1951)
cited as Curtis).
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of ethical character and conduct. The attitude which Mr. Dooley
reflected in a rather penetrating observation to Mr. Hennessy at the
turn of the century remains with us strongly at the present time:
"I wud lie to get a frind out iv throuble or an inimy in, to save me
counthry, if 't was not surrounded already by a devoted band iv
heroic liars, to protict me life or me property, but if annybody ast me
162
how I done it, I'd lie out iv it."
For these reasons, it behooves the state to maintain a policy which
favors the public's choosing honest lawyers. The privilege helps to
keep the honest lawyer's resources more on a par with the resources
of the dishonest lawyer. This in turn affords the client greater freedom to choose an honest lawyer and the honest lawyer more latitude
in dealing with his client's cause as an advocate during its formative
stages. Here it is important that the ethical lawyers should not be
placed in a strait jacket. If they should be, some would remain
punctilliously honest and lose their clients or the clients would suffer;
others would reduce their standards in varying degrees. For the
utterly unethical there would be no problem, but their relative
flexibility would be increased. While the ultimate victims would be
the clients, the actualization of their status as victims would occur
only when the legal compulsion to make disclosure impinged on their
individual personalities.
Furthermore, in addition to the arrant factor in human nature,
there is the natural, reasonable, and proper desire of men to arrange
their affairs in order before formally presenting them to the public.
The privilege affords men a reasonable expectation that this desire
will be carried forward to fruition. In the absence of the pri-ilege, this
desire would be frustrated in many instances, particularly where there
was diligent counsel on the opposing side of the case. In some of
these instances, individual justice might miscarry, as a result of the
improper presentation of one's story before he had taken time to
think the matter through to its ultimate conclusion. This right to
tell one's own story in his own way and at the time of his own
choosing is an important interest of personality, closely akin to if
not actually a part of the right to privacy. It might be described
as the preliminary right to privacy or the right to privacy in the
subjective stages of the matter, before the interest of the state in
the production of evidence requires a formal presentation of the
pretrial foundations of such evidence. This assumes, of course, in an
area where all is not a matter of black and white, that one is going
162. FINLUY PXTER DUNN4,

(1901).
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to tell the truth as best he can, but in doing so he wants to make it
appear in as favorable light as the circumstances will permit, and he
wants to give his version of the matter in a friendly and sympathetic
frame of reference. Does not the privilege assist us here? The writer
believes that it does. To use the metaphor of the stage, it seems no
more than right that we should be permitted to prepare ourselves and
study our presentation before the dress rehearsal and the opening
night. The late Charles P. Curtis has excellently stated the point:
To every one of us come occasions when we don't want to
tell the truth, not all of it, certainly not all of it at once, when
we want to be something less than candid, a little disingenuous.
Indeed, to be candid with ourselves, there are times when we
deliberately and more or less justifiably undertake to tell something less or something different. Complete candor to anyone
but ourselves is a virtue that belongs to the saints, to the secure,
and to the very courageous. Even when we do want to tell the
truth, all of it, ultimately, we see no reason why we should
not take our own time, tell it as skillfully and as gracefully as we
can, and most of us doubt our own ability to do this as well by
ourselves and for ourselves as another could do it for us. So
we go3 to a lawyer. He will make a better fist of it than we
16
can.

This leads into another aspect of the matter, which relates to
our system of litigation as a part of the received common law. Even
though the "sporting theory of justice"' 4 is no longer popular, our
system of judicial administration remains adversary in nature, with
certain inherent characteristics (which reflect both its advantages
and its limitations). Among these is the nature of a lawsuit as a
contest between opposing parties, who are themselves responsible for
obtaining and presenting the evidence and pointing out the applicable
rules of law. Inherent in the very nature of the system is the pivotal
role of the lawyer in litigation. Moreover, within the limits of the
observable rules of law and ethics, the lawyer's obligation to act and
his duty of loyalty run to his client.' 65 This is true even though the
lawyer should believe that justice lies on the other side of the case.
It has been said that the lawyer has no other master than his client
and that the court itself comes second by the law's own command. 66
One of the strongest statements of this tenet of loyalty was that put
163. Curtis 8-9.
164. See I WIGMORE §§ 27, 57, 194; VI WIGMORt § 1845 at 345 et seq. esp.
375-76; VIII WIGMORF § 2251.
165. See Canons 5, 6, 15, 37; cf. Canons 22, 29, 32; see Opinions thereunder.
166. Curtis 3. But see Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis' 'The Ethics of
Advocacy,' 4 STAN. L. REv. 349 (1951). There is a difference of opinion as to
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by Lord Brougham in his defense of Queen Caroline, where he said
to the House of Lords:
I once before took occasion to remind your Lordships, which
was unnecessary, but there are many whom it may be needful
to remind, that an advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes
to his client, knows in the discharge of that office but one person
in the world -

that client and no other. ....

Nay, separating

even the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and casting
them if need be to the wind, he must go on reckless of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be 1 67to involve his
country in confusion for his client's protection.
This being true, there is the matter of treachery to be considered, but
there is more than mere treachery - there is the matter of the
lawyer's identifying himself with the client's cause. The attorney
must decide at the outset of the case whether to embrace the cause
as his own, and if he decides in the affirmative, he must remain with
it. If he should later desire to withdraw from the case, it will be
necessary for him to obtain permission of the client. If the client
should refuse his permission, the attorney cannot withdraw from the
case without an order of the court, and this will not be given unless
the lawyer shows good grounds for withdrawing. Furthermore,
except infrequently and under special circumstances such withdrawals
by permission of the court are frowned upon by both the bench and
the bar. The attorney is in charge of the case and to some extent
vouches for the good conduct of the client, where this is within his
control. 6 If the attorney cannot give his best effort to the matter,
he must withdraw from the case, but even then his withdrawal is
subject to the condition that the client's cause must not be prejudiced
thereby. In such instance, the court would not permit counsel's withdrawal, at least in the absence of affirmative consent from the
client. 9
This attitude toward withdrawal by counsel from a case is reflected in the canons of ethics, which provide that an attorney should
not accept a case in which he might be a material witness. While this
whether
Drinker
167.
168.
169.

a lawyer could ethically go so far as to lie for his client. Curtis 7 et seq.;
(contra).
Curtis 4.
See canons 24, 29, 31, 32, 41, and Opinions thereunder.
See Canons 5, 15, 30, 31, 32, 37, 41, 44; DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 140-42,

144-45, 146-49 (1953).

See also

LAWYERS'

PROBLEMS

OF CONSCIENCE

1-23 (Am.

Law Student Ass'n, 1953) ; Maguire, op. cit. note 1, 35-37, 39 n. 46 (1957). Moreover, the lawyer may never thereafter take a position whereby he may use confidential information for an adverse purpose (without the permission of the client
or former client). Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros., 216 F. 2d 920, 52
A.L.R. 2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1954) (plaintiff's attorney disqualified from representing
adverse interest of former client in anti-trust suit, pursuant to Canon 6).
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principle has never been adopted as a rule of law, it is recognized as
ethically sound, because of the central role of the lawyer in the litigation process. The attorney by becoming a witness might strongly
influence the trier of fact, either for or against the client, depending
upon the opinion which the trier should entertain of counsel, the party,
and the cause.17 Furthermore the attorney himself could not maintain the desired impartiality in his role as witness, while his services
in that capacity (and his knowledge of the facts) might affect his
capability, as an advocate, to give his undivided loyalty to his client.
Finally, there exists as a practical consideration in support of
the preservation of the privilege what Professor McCormick has referred to as the "cake of custom," the innate desire of people to follow
the history and usages with which they are familiar. When this
desire is coupled with the professional relationship to experts (attorneys) in an adversary system of law, an extra quota of the sentiment
of loyalty attaches, "and this sentiment would be outraged by an
attempt to change our customs so as to make the lawyer amenable to

routine examination upon the client's confidential disclosures regarding
professional business. Loyalty and sentiment are silken threads, but
they are hard to break."' 7 1 As a result, the privilege could hardly be
abolished today, in any event, but its obstructive effects can be
reduced and contained within reasonable bounds ;172 while at the same
time its benefits can be retained for the public good.

Opponents of the privilege have argued that the public is unaware
of its existence until a particular individual is advised thereof by
his lawyer, and therefore the privilege does not have the beneficial
effect of making the client feel able to communicate freely with his
lawyer. But this ignores the over-all pattern of general effect of the
personal privileges, the strength of custom and tradition in the fabric
of our society, and the picture of justice as a whole. While these
factors cannot be measured with exactitude, neither can they be
ignored. Law is "the explicit and articulate part" of what is implicit in
a culture. Jurisprudence is "an anthropology of the literate part of
our culture.'

1 73

Law is not only reposed upon "a base of what Sum-

ner has called folkways or mores, and what Ruth Benedict was
calling patterns of culture, but contained these within itself. These
170. Canon 19; DRINKER, op. cit. note 169, 158. See Note, Ethical Propriety
of Attorney's Testifying in Behalf of his own Client, 38 IOWA L. Rv. 139 (1952).
171.

MCCORMICK 182.

172. Ibid.
173. Curtis, Ethics in the Law, 4 STAN. L. Rxv. 477, 484 (1952).
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folkways, these mores, these patterns were part of the law, and
perhaps the most important part of it."' 4 It has been said that the
privilege against self-incrimination is taken in by the members of
the criminal element in their infancy and with their mothers' milk.'
While the other privileges may not be so well known and understood,
they are intuitively felt and relied upon generally and are readily
accepted as natural when explained by counsel. The privileges as
received ideals of the common law are an important part of our mores.
Social anthropology corroborates this. Ruth Benedict has lucidly
described this phenomena in the following illuminating passage:
No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees
it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions and ways
of thinking. Even in his philosophical probings he cannot go
behind these stereotypes; his very concepts of the true and the
false will have reference to his particular traditional customs....
The life history of the individual is first and foremost an accommodation to the patterns and standards traditionally handed
down in his community. From the moment of his birth the
customs into which he is born shape his experience and behavior.
By the time he can talk, he is the little creature of his culture,
and by the time he is grown and able to take part in its activities,
its habits are his habits, its beliefs his beliefs, its impossibilities
his impossibilities. Every child that is born into his group will
share them with him, and no child born into one on the opposite
side of the globe can ever achieve the thousandth part. There is
no social problem it is more incumbent upon us to understand
than this of the role of custom. Until we. are intelligent as to
complicating facts of human life
its laws and varieties, the 7main
6
must remain unintelligible.
It has been argued that the privilege affords its chief benefit in
excluding proof which would enable an opponent to make out a prima
facie case or defense ;177 and that except for this, it is of dubious
value, as the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from its use
174. Id. 485.
175. Professor John M. Maguire, to his class in Evidence (taught jointly with
Professor E. M. Morgan), Harvard Law School, Summer Term, 1946, the writer
being present.
176. BENEDICT,

PATTERNS OF CULTURE

2 (1934).

177. Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d 812, 141 A.L.R. 548 (9th Cir. 1942),
is a good illustration. In a suit for estate taxes on a gift of realty made in a
manner to take effect in possession and enjoyment at death, the only evidence
available to the government consisted of privileged communications. There was
no fraud involved, because the decedent made the gift to avoid probate problems
and did not consider the tax angle. It could be argued that she meant the privilege
to be temporary only, as in the will cases, but the court treated it as having
passed to the devisee as her personal representative. (See MCCORMICK § 98;
VIII WIGMORt § 2314.)

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/1

58

Gardner: A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (Part I)
SPRING

1963]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

in any event. 7 ' The writer, however, must disagree. 9 The privilege
has an affect in all cases, either actual or potential. 8 We cannot say
that it has greater affect on the accuracy of the findings of fact in
one type of case than in another. There is at present no way to
objectively test this matter. Moreover, by reason of its mere existence
the privilege prevents the seeking of privilege-protected evidence,
especially in the pretrial discovery stage of the lawsuit. If the
existence and nature of such evidence is never ascertained in the
pretrial discovery proceedings, then (except by chance) no effort can
be made to draw it out at the trial. No actual claim of privilege
will be made, because it will not be necessary to make it. Thus, the
trier of fact has no occasion to know about the non-use of such evidence and, therefore, cannot draw any adverse inference therefrom.' 8'
Furthermore, probably the only parties who will ever know specifically
that damaging evidence has been withheld from the opponent and
ultimately from the trier of fact will be the withholding party and his
counsel.
In the law of attorney-client privilege there are two degrees of
confidentiality, degrees which blend into each other but which are
basically so different as to deserve at least de facto recognition as
distinct classifications. This dichotomous nature of the privilege is
generally overlooked: (1) There are the numerous communications
pertaining to the problem concerning which advice is sought. These the
client will make to his lawyer with reasonable freedom and sense of
security or well-being. They may include items which the client would
be reluctant to communicate in the absence of the privilege, but they
will be found to contain nothing concerning which he would feel more
than the ordinary amount of hesitancy in imparting to one who
he feels is strongly on his side in a problem situation. (2) Beyond
that, however, there are in varying degrees facts requiring revelations
178. MCCORMICK 164. But see Functional Overlap between the Lawyer and
Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine,
71 YALU L. J. 1226, 1237-38 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Functional Overlap).
179. While this is a practical "benefit," it is merely incidental to the underlying
policies discussed herein, and even the party must as a practical matter realize
the greatest benefit from the sense of security or freedom from fear which he
is thus enabled to achieve "in the anteroom of the court" and in the courtroom
itself.
180. The avoidance of the time consuming examination of counsel in pretrial
discovery proceedings is not an unimportant item to be considered.
For a case in which the appellate court felt that the erroneous allowance of the
claim of privilege was not harmless error, see Maier v. Noonan, 174 Cal. App. 2d
260, 344 P. 2d 373 (1959) (hearing in Supreme Court denied). In a paternity
suit, the defendant got to the jury with his own evidence but would have been
able to cast strong doubt on plaintiff's case had he been allowed to show what
plaintiff had stated to an attorney whom she had consulted but did not retain.
181. See text at note 178; op. cit. note 149 at 271 n. 32, 273 n. 38; cf. id.
280-83.
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which would tend to disgrace and to incriminate. These are items
which the client would be reluctant ever to impart to anyone except
the most trusted confidant. They are items which the client would
intend that his lawyer should never reveal to anyone.
Every lawyer of mature years has experienced this last-described
type of situation and has realized the inestimable value of the privilege
in such cases. In this area of really confidential communications,
there is every reason to believe that the client's secrets are seldom if
ever reduced to writing." 2 They remain a matter of sacred trust, as
safe as if in the bosom of Mr. Tulkinghorn.'1 3 It is here that the
privilege has its greatest claim to necessity and where it should be
guarded most carefully. Here, its preservation is necessary to the
fair administration of justice. Here, its denial would prevent the
communication of the facts to counsel; or if the facts were communicated, the sense of treachery when counsel was forced to disclose
them (or to lie in order to avoid disclosing them) would tend to
make the attorney an object of contempt and thus would tend to
pervert the function of counselling. It is here that the privilege deserves the claim to recognition that no other personal privilege can
make." 4 Whatever modifications in the present law may be made in
the interest of greater accuracy in fact-finding, great care should be
taken to assure that this hard core area of the privilege is adequately
safeguarded and remains free from compulsory disclosure in all except the most extreme cases, as where life or personal liberty hang
in the opposing balance.
These factors are practical considerations, and they exist in
innumerable and diverse forms, as variegated as life itself. Moreover,
they change in sometimes sharp and sometimes imperceptible gradations, as the social milieu of a society changes in response to the
external stimuli of the complex modern environment. But there are
182. The term "hard core area" of the privilege is used hereinafter in a somewhat looser sense, however. It is used, unless otherwise noted, to mean the
area embraced within the face-to-face relationship, having in mind that the privilege
is most essential for the protection of the communications subsumed under the
second category set out above. The term "hard core area" of the privilege as
descriptive of the said second category, while readily understood, could not be
accurately delineated by counsel and the courts, since its boundaries would tend
to be somewhat subjective and to involve impossible problems of effective interpretation. Hence, the proper construction should be liberal in the area delineated by
the face-to-face relationship and strict in peripheral areas beyond that area.
183. "Here . . . Mr. Tulkinghorn has at once his house and office. He keeps
no staff; only one middle aged man . . . who sits in a high Pew in the hall. . ..
He wants no clerks. He is a great reservoir of confidences, not to be so tapped.
His clients want HIM. He is all in all." DICKENS, BLEAK House Ch. 10. Compare
with text at notes 157-58.
184. This is because compulsory discovery is a potential factor in all attorneyclient situations, whereas, it is generally only a more or less remote possibility in
other personal privilege type situations.
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more than these practical considerations of how modern man behaves
in his basic socio-psychological essence in our society that should be
considered in the restatement of policy in support of the privileges.
There is more than a realistic appraisal of man's inherent limitations
in our society. There is a recognition of a new set of values in the
twentieth century, values beyond the vindication of the immediate rights
of the parties in the particular litigation, values based on the over-all
picture of the end of law in our society. These values have already
been briefly mentioned. Their philosophical significance will be examined and illustrations considered in the remaining sections of this
paper. Hence, we move from empirical specification to trans-empirical
derivation and justification.
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